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IN THE TAX DIVISION OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
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KENNECOTT CORPORATION, MORTON 
THIOKOL, INC., BARRICK RESOURCES 
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ARTHUR L. MONSON, Salt Lake 
County Treasurer; and GRANT L. 
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Treasurer, 
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Before the Court are reciprocal motions for partial 
summary judgment and other related reciprocal motions to strike 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, FINAL 
ORDER AND CERTIFICATION 
Civil No. 88-3457 
Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
various supporting affidavits and attached exhibits. The parties 
filed extensive memoranda, appeared through their .counsel and 
argued orally. Plaintiffs appeared by and through their attor-
neys, Maxwell A. Miller and Kent W. Winterholler. Defendants 
appeared by and through their attorneys, Bill Thomas Peters, 
special Deputy Salt Lake County and Tooele County attorney, and 
Karl Hendricksen, Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney. 
The Court, having heard the arguments of counsel, and 
having considered legal authorities and memoranda filed by the 
parties, issued its Memorandum Decision on the above-stated 
motions on April 11, 1989. Based on that Memorandum Decision, 
and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, the Court 
hereby enters the following Summary Judgment, Final Order, and 
Certification pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
1. The Court rules that plaintiffs lack standing to 
contest the constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. S 17-19-15 (1987) 
under Article XIII, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution. 
2. The Court rules that Utah Code Ann. S 17-19-15 
(1987) is in furtherance of resolving a matter of statewide 
concern, and as such, is constitutional under Article, XIII 
Section 5 of the Utah Constitution. 
3. The Court rules that the revenue distribution 
aspect of the funding mechanism established by Utah Code Ann. S 
17-19-15 (1987) does not mandate revenue sharing between 
-2-
counties, and, therefore, does not violate that provision of 
Article XIII, Section 5 which permits only consensual revenue 
sharing, 
4. Based on the foregoing, the Court denies plain-
tiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
5. The Court grants defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment as it pertains to the constitutionality of Utah Code 
Ann. S 17-19-15 (1987) under Article XIII, Section 5 of the Utah 
Constitution. 
6. The Court denies the parties' respective motions 
to strike. 
7. The Court dismisses plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, 
with respect to its First Cause of Action, with prejudice. 
8. The Court rules that there are multiple parties in 
the present action and that plaintiffs' Amended Complaint raises 
multiple claims. 
9. The Court rules that the Summary Judgment entered 
herein is a final order, wholly disposes of plaintiffs' First 
Cause of Action, and would be appealable but for the presence of 
plaintiffs' remaining claims. 
10. The Court determines and certifies that there is 
no just reason to delay the plaintiffs from taking an appeal from 
the present Summary Judgment and Final Order. 
-3-
DATED this 1 day of &$&, 1989, 
BY THE CQORT: 
IORABLE TIMOTHY K. HANSON 
Third District Court Judge 
Tax Division 
Qtii"*' 
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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF CASE 
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to 
Article VIII, Section 3 of the Utah Constitution, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2 (1989), and Rule 4 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme 
Court. 
This is an appeal by Kennecott Corporation, Morton 
Thiokol, Inc., Barrick Resources (USA) Inc., and Hercules, 
Incorporated (hereinafter referred to as the "Coalition") from a 
Summary Judgment and Final Order entered on August 7, 1989 by the 
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
in favor of Utah State Tax Commission, et. aJ. (hereinafter 
referred to as the "County and State defendants"), holding that 
(1) the Coalition members lacked standing to contest the consti-
tutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 17-19-15 (1987); (2) Utah Code 
Ann. § 17-19-15 (1987) furthers a statewide purpose and is thus 
constitutional; and (3) Utah Code Ann. § 17-19-15 (1987) does not 
mandate revenue sharing in violation of Article XIII, Section 5 
of the Utah Constitution. 
1
 All parties to this proceeding are listed in the caption of 
this case. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Do the Coalition members have standing to chal-
lenge the constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. S 17-19-15 (1987), 
which establishes a system for assessing, collecting aid distrib-
uting property taxes? 
2. Does Utah Code Ann. S 17-19-15 (1987) .mpose upon 
the Coalition an obligation to pay state taxes for the benefit of 
2 
Salt Lake and Tooele Counties m violation of Article XIII, 
Section 5 of the Utah Constitution? 
3. Does the revenue distribution aspect oi Utah Code 
Ann. S 17-19-15 (1987) mandate revenue sharing between counties 
in violation of Article XIII, Section 5 of the Utah Co istitution? 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Article XIII, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution 
provides: 
The Legislature shall not impose taxes fo • 
the purpose of any county, city, town o • 
other municipal corporation, but may, by law 
vest in the corporate authorities thereof 
respectively, the power to assess and collec 
taxes for all purposes of such corporation 
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary 
2 The Coalition members also own property in Box Elder, Davis 
and Utah counties which have also imposed upon Coalit:on members 
ad valorem taxes pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 17-19-1!; however, 
only Salt Lake and Tooele counties are named defendants to this 
action. 
-2-
contained in this Constitution, political 
subdivisions may share their tax and other 
revenues with other political subdivisions as 
provided by statute. 
Senate Bill 151, 1986, Utah Laws Ch. 109 Section 1, 
Codified at Utah Code Ann. § 17-19-15, is set forth in Appendix A 
to this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Proceedings. In 1987, the Coalition 
members, as taxpayers in Utah, had imposed upon them an assess-
ment, collection, and distribution levy under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 17-19-15 in the amount of .0005 of the assessed value of their 
property. Record at 9. On May 25, 1988, the Coalition commenced 
this action by filing a Complaint in the Third Judicial District 
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. Record at 2-37. The 
Coalition's Complaint, as amended, sought a declaratory judgment 
that the Act violated various provisions of the state and federal 
constitutions, recovery of taxes paid under protest, and injunc-
tive relief enjoining enforcement of the Act. Record at 53-66. 
The Coalition's first claim for relief asserts that the Act is 
unconstitutional because it violates Article XIII, Section 5 of 
the Utah Constitution. Record at 57-60. 
The County and State defendants answered the Complaint. 
Record at 67-90 and 273-280. The Coalition and County defendants 
-3-
then filed reciprocal motions for partial summary judgment with 
supporting affidavits and exhibits with respect to the 
Coalition's first claim for relief* Record at 98-137 and 
270-272. 
2. Decision of the Court. On April 11, 1989, the 
district court entered a Memorandum Decision, attached hereto as 
Exhibit A (Record at 291-300), and on August 7, 1989, entered a 
Summary Judgment, Final Order, and Certification, attached hereto 
as Exhibit B (Record at 308-311). The district court ruled that 
the Coalition members lacked standing to contest the constitu-
tionality of Utah Code Ann. § 17-19-15 (1987) under Article XIII, 
Section 5 of the Utah Constitution; that Utah Code Ann. 
S 17-19-15 (1987) is in furtherance of resolving matters of 
statewide concern, and therefore, is constitutional under Article 
XIII, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution; and that the revenue 
distribution aspect established by Utah Code Ann. § 17-19-15 
(1987) does not mandate revenue sharing between counties, and, 
3
 The State defendants have preferred to remain neutral 
throughout the entire proceeding, having neither joined nor 
participated in either party's summary judgment motion. The 
State defendants are in a difficult and inconsistent position 
since the Tax Commission Chairman has filed an affidavit describ-
ing what he sees as the expedient benefits of the Act (Record at 
260-263), while the Attorney General has opined that the Act is 
unconstitutional. Record at 14-29. 
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therefore, does not violate Article XIII, Section 5 which permits 
only consensual revenue sharing. Record at 309. Based on the 
foregoing, the district court denied the Coalition's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment and granted the County defendants' 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as it pertained to the 
constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 17-19-15 (1987) under 
Article XIII, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution. Record at 310. 
Pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the 
district court certified that there was no just reason to delay 
the Coalition from taking an appeal from the present Summary 
Judgment and Final Order. Record at 310. 
The district court determined in its Memorandum Deci-
sion "that Section 17-19-15 is in furtherance of resolving a 
matter of statewide concern, and as such is constitutional under 
Article XIII, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution." Record at 
297. As a basis for its determination, the district court 
adopted the arguments the County defendants made in their Memo-
randum In Response To Motion For Partial Summary Judgment And In 
Support Of Defendants' Cross-Motion For Summary Judgment, 
attached hereto as Exhibit C. Record at 177-215. The district 
court also ruled that the revenue distribution aspect of the Act 
does not mandate revenue sharing, but rather provides for consen-
sual revenue sharing since it "merely provides that where 
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counties generate proceeds in excess of budgeted amounts that are 
the result of a uniform statewide tax levy, that those excess 
funds may be diverted to other counties in conformity with the 
funding programs in the spirit of the statewide purpose of 
uniformity assessment valuation." Record at 297 (emphasis 
added). Additionally, the district court noted that the Utah 
Association of Counties, the Utah League of Cities and Towns, and 
the Utah State School Board Associations have, on behalf of their 
members, supported Utah Code Ann. § 17-19-15 and, on that basis, 
concluded that "even if the statutory provision mandated revenue 
sharing, it would not be offensive to Article XIII, Section 5, 
because the counties do so voluntarily." Record at 298. 
Finally, the district court ruled that the Coalition 
members do not have standing to bring this lawsuit because the 
individual counties or their elective representatives are the 
only entities that have standing. Record at 297. 
3. Statement of Facts. In the 1986 General Session 
of the Utah Legislature, the Utah Legislature enacted Senate Bill 
No. 151, codified at Utah Code Ann. § 17-19-15, entitled "An Act 
Relating to Counties; Providing for the Collection, Assessment, 
and Distribution Costs Charged by the County and Providing an 
Effective Date" (hereinafter referred to as the "Act"). The Act 
imposes a mandatory statewide levy upon all real property for the 
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purpose of defraying costs incurred by Utah's counties in assess-
ing, collecting and distributing property taxes for, in behalf 
of, and to various taxing entities and districts located within 
each county's geographical boundaries. 
Before the Act became effective, each county was 
responsible for budgeting the costs for assessment, collection 
and distribution of property taxes for that county. Each county 
determined the categories of costs and expenses involved in the 
assessment, collection, and distribution of property taxes it 
levied. The individual county then set a tax rate at the appro-
priate level to fund these costs. The state did not participate, 
nor did it have any responsibility, in determining county budgets 
and did not participate in levying taxes to fund these county 
purposes. 
Under the Act's provisions, individual counties no 
longer have the discretion to identify, budget, and levy for 
costs the county deems legitimate. Each county is now required 
to separately budget for certain categorical costs incurred in 
the assessment, collection, and distribution of property taxes 
and related appraisal programs for submission to the state 
auditor for review. The counties no longer set a local tax rate 
to cover these costs. Utah Code Ann. § 17-19-15(1). 
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The budget submitted to the state auditor is limited to 
certain categories of allowable costs which the state auditor 
establishes, and is subject to certification for compliance with 
these set categories. id. § 17-19-15(2). After certification by 
the state auditor, the aggregate costs o£ each county are trans-
mitted to the State Tax Commission "for determination of a 
mandatory statewide tax rate sufficient to meet these expendi-
tures ." Id. § 17-19-15(3) (emphasis added). The tax rate set by 
the State Tax Commission may not exceed a maximum of .0005 per 
dollar of taxable value of taxable property, with certain excep-
tions. Id. § 17-19-15(4). Any revenues received by a county 
pursuant to the provisions of the Act, in excess of the amount of 
its certified budget, are required to be transmitted to the state 
treasurer for distribution to other counties. Id,. § 17-19-15(6). 
The result of this redistribution scheme created by the 
Act is that the counties with a large property tax base subsidize 
counties with a smaller property tax base. In short, two groups 
of counties result; some counties are "exporting counties" and 
4 
other are "importing counties." Record at 166. 
4
 See also Affidavit of Auston Johnson, III and its attached 
Exhibit Al. Apparently due to oversight, the Johnson Affidavit 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Article XIII, Section 5 is a specific constitutional 
prohibition against the state legislature's imposition of taxes 
for county purposes or functions. The purpose of this constitu-
tional proscription is to preserve the autonomy of local govern-
ments by precluding state officials from influencing or deciding 
local issues. This Court has repeatedly interpreted this consti-
tutional provision as prohibiting the state from levying taxes 
for county purposes. 
The Act imposes a mandatory statewide tax for the 
purpose of funding local county functions in violation of Article 
XIII, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution. Because the Act 
violates Article XIII, Section 5, the district court erred in 
granting summary judgment to the County defendants. While 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
and the Motion to Supplement the Record requesting permission to 
enter the Johnson Affidavit into evidence was not made a part of 
the record. However, the County defendants' Motion to Strike the 
Affidavit of Auston Johnson, III is part of the record (Record at 
282-286) and is referenced in the district court's Memorandum 
Decision when the district court declined to strike the Johnson 
Affidavit from the record. Record at 292. Thus, the Johnson 
Affidavit was apparently omitted by error. The Johnson Affidavit 
is attached hereto as Exhibit D. On December 28, 1989, the 
Coalition filed a Motion to Correct the Record in the district 
court to have the Johnson affidavit and its exhibits included in 
the record. 
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legislative statutes are presumed valid, the judiciary has the 
responsibility to ensure that the safeguards placed in our 
Constitution are preserved. Characterizing the Act as being for 
statewide purposes cannot and does not override a specific 
constitutional prohibition. To so hold renders Article XIII, 
Section 5 meaningless because the stat€> could levy for county 
purposes at any time under the guise that a statewide purpose is 
being furthered. 
Each Coalition member has standing to contest the 
provisions of the Act. This Court clarified standing guidelines 
in Terracor v. Utah Board of State Lands & Forestry, 716 P.2d 796 
(Utah 1986). The Coalition members meet all of the three crite-
ria this Court listed: First, the Coalition members have 
"suffered some distinct and palpable injury that gives [the 
Coalition] a personal stake in the outcome of the legal dispute." 
Id. at 799. Second, no one else has "a greater interest in the 
outcome of the case and the issues are unlikely to be raised at 
all unless [the Coalition] has standing to raise the issue." Id. 
And third, the issue raised in this appeal is unique and of great 
public importance which should be decided in furtherance of the 
public interest. Id. 
Finally, the Act mandates revenue sharing amongst 
counties. Regardless of whether the counties agree to share 
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revenues, the Act is written in the imperative mode, mandating 
compliance. The Act does not provide for consensual revenue 
sharing, and this clearly violates the Constitution, which 
permits only consensual sharing. Furthermore, the counties have 
failed to take appropriate and necessary actions under which 
legal consent to share revenues is authorized. Informal county 
actions or the vote of county associations are not the requisite 
actions to be taken by a county in order to authorize revenue 
sharing. Therefore, the revenue sharing scheme fails for lack of 
proper authorization. 
ARGUMENT 
Introduction. Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure provides that Summary Judgment is appropriate if there 
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Bowen v. Riverton 
City, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982). Although it was appropriate for 
the district court to grant summary judgment in the absence of 
factual disputes, the district court erred in granting the County 
defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment because the Act 
violates Article XIII, Section 5. The Coalition, rather than the 
County defendants, is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of 
law. Accordingly, the district court's summary judgment and 
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final order should be reversed with directions to enter summary 
judgment for the Coalition. 
I. THE COALITION MEMBERS HAVE STANDING TO 
CHALLENGE THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 17-19-15. 
The district court erred in holding that the Coalition 
members lacked standing to contest the constitutionality of the 
Act. This Court, in Terracor, supra at 798, summarized Utah case 
law on standing as follows: 
The first general criterion is that the 
'[p]laintiff must be able to show that he has 
suffered some distinct and palpable injury 
that gives him a personal stake in the 
outcome of the legal dispute.' 
Second, if a Plaintiff does not have standing 
under the first criteria, he may have stand-
ing if no one else has a greater interest in 
the outcome of the case and the issues are 
unlikely to be raised at all unless that 
particular Plaintiff has standing to raise 
the issue. 
Third, even though standing is not found to 
exist under the first two criteria, a Plain-
tiff may nonetheless have standing if the 
issues are unique and are of such great 
public importance that they ought to be 
decided in furtherance of the public 
interest. 
The Coalition members satisfy each of these standards. 
First, as taxpayers and owners of real property, the Coalition 
members are directly affected by the distribution of tax pro-
ceeds. Indeed, the distribution scheme of the Act requires the 
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Coalition to pay a tax, which, in part, would not be otherwise 
due. More importantly, because the levy assessed against the 
Coalition reflects the counties' budgeted costs in which the 
Coalition has no presence, the Coalition members have suffered a 
real and "palpable" injury. If the Coalition members do not have 
standing to contest the constitutionality of this distribution 
scheme, they will be denied an opportunity to seek any redress 
since they have no right to representation before counties in 
which they have no presence or property (but yet are bearing the 
costs of county assessment operations). For this reason, the 
Coalition members have the requisite "personal stake in the 
outcome of the legal dispute." Id. 
Second, no one else has a greater interest in the 
outcome of this case than Coalition members or similarly situated 
taxpayers. Unless the Coalition raises this issue it is unlikely 
to be raised at all. The Coalition members own substantial 
property in Tooele, Box Elder, Utah, Davis, and Salt Lake Coun-
ties and pay substantial taxes under the Act. Most other taxpay-
ers have less valuable property and cannot justify the necessary 
legal expenses to challenge the Act. Moreover, this Court has 
previously held that local taxpayers have standing to contest 
state tax levies to fund county functions (school fund budget 
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items). In Olson v. Salt Lake City School District, 724 P. 2d 
960, 962-63 (Utah 1986), (footnote 1), this Court stated: 
We find that applying the general principles 
enunciated in the cases noted, individual 
taxpayers in Salt Lake City would be granted 
standing on the basis that there are no more 
likely appellants and the issue is otherwise 
unlikely to be raised. 
Third, the issues presented in this case are unique and 
of great public interest. Certainly a statutory taxing scheme 
which affects every property owner in Utah by imposing a manda-
tory statewide levy on each of the 29 counties in this state is 
of great public importance. 
One additional criteria frequently overlooked in the 
Terracor decision is found in footnote four on page 799 which 
states that M[i]n addition, taxpayers may have standing to 
challenge an illegal expenditure." This additional criteria was 
previously recited in Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1153 (Utah 
1983) wherein this Court stated that M [it] has long held that a 
taxpayer has standing to prosecute an action against municipali-
ties and other political subdivisions of the state for illegal 
expenditures." See also Olson v. Salt Lake City School District, 
supra at 962-63, footnote 1. A taxpayer's right to sue over the 
illegal use of public monies has been extended to include an 
action against the state. Jenkins, supra at 1153. To have 
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standing to challenge the Act the Coalition need not show injury. 
In Jenkins, this Court stated: 
• [A] taxpayer should be permitted to enjoin 
the unlawful expenditure of tax monies in 
which he has a pecuniary interest, or to 
prevent increased levies for illegal pur-
poses.' In arriving at this conclusion, we 
quoted with approval the following language 
of the Illinois Supreme Court: 
We have repeatedly held that taxpayers 
may resort to a court of equity to prevent 
the misapplication of public funds, and that 
this right is based upon the taxpayers * 
equitable ownership of such funds and their 
liability to replenish the public treasury 
for the deficiency which would be caused by 
the misappropriation. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
Finally, it should be noted that one of the Coalition 
members has a further right to standing pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-2-1411 (1987). Kennecott Corporation paid its 1987 
taxes under protest and brought the action below to recover those 
taxes; it thus has standing to contest the lawfulness of the 
taxes imposed. "The constitutionality or legality of a tax 
statute may be raised in an action that is properly filed pursu-
ant to § 59-11-1 [sic] [(§ 59-11-11 (supp. 1981) is the predeces-
sor to § 59-2-1411 (1987))] in the district court." Id. at 1152. 
-15-
II. UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-19-15 VIOLATES ARTICLE 
XIII, SECTION 5 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
A. The Supreme Court of Utah has Repeatedly Enforced 
Article XIII, Section 5 to Prohibit State Levies for County 
Purposes. 
Since 1901, and as recently as 1979, the Utah Supreme 
Court has interpreted Article XIII, Section 5 to preclude the 
legislature from forcing county governments to tax for state 
5 
purposes. None of the cases interpreting Article XIII, Section 
5 has overruled any of the preceding cases; and all consistently 
stress three salient doctrines emanating from Article XIII, 
Section 5: 
1. The state, acting through its legislature, 
may impose taxes only for a state purpose. 
2. The levy and collection of local ad valorem 
taxes is a county function, not a state 
function, even though the state, acting 
through the Tax Commission, must "assess" or 
value certain properties on a unitary basis. 
5
 The significant cases interpreting Article XIII, Section 5 
are: State v. Standford, 24 Utah 148, 66 P. 1061 (1901); State 
v. Eldredqe, 27 Utah 477, 76 P. 337 (1904); Salt Lake County v. 
Salt Lake City, 42 Utah 548, 124 P. 560 (1913); Bailey v. Van 
Dyke, 66 Utah 184, 240 P. 454 (1925); The Best Foods v. 
Christensen, 75 Utah 392, 285 P. 1001 (1930); Smith v. Carbon 
County, 90 Utah 560, 63 P.2d 259 (1936); Tribe v. Salt Lake City 
Corp., 540 P.2d 499 (Utah 1975); Salt Lake County v. Murray City 
Redevelopment, 598 P.2d 1339 (Utah 1979)? Baker v. Matheson, 607 
P.2d 233 (Utah 1979) . 
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3. Article XIII, Section 5 precludes state 
interference with county taxation. 
Each of these points are explained below through a brief survey 
of relevant cases, 
1. The state, acting through its legislature, may 
impose taxes only for a state purpose. 
Article XIII, Section 5's underlying intent, as first 
declared in State v. Standford, 24 Utah 148, 149, 66 P. 1061, 
1062 (1901), is to prevent the state from compelling a county to 
levy taxes for county functions or purposes: 
When the county government is established 
separate from the state, each is compelled 
to bear its own burdens, and not assume 
those of the other. The legislature is 
forbidden to impose taxes for county 
purposes, as is the county for state 
purposes, and the state is not authorized 
to impose taxes for other than state 
purposes. 
(Emphasis added.) 
In Standford, the Utah Supreme Court held that a state 
statute, which required the county commission of each county to 
appoint a horticulturist as a tree inspector, violated Article 
XIII, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution. 
The aspects of the statute challenged in Standford that 
offended Article XIII, Section 5 were: (1) The state inspector, 
with the advice of the state board, appointed deputy inspectors 
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as he saw fit, thus compelling the county to "levy and collect 
taxes with which to pay such officers." Icl- (2) County commis-
sioners had no supervisory control over the inspectors, which "in 
no sense can be called county officers." Id. (3) The county was 
compelled to audit and pay the monthly salaries of the inspector 
and deputies. 
Upon these facts the Standford Court concluded: 
[S]ection 5, art. 13, of the constitution, 
not only limits local or county taxation to 
local county purposes, but it was also 
intended as a limitation upon the power of 
the legislature to grant the right or 
impose the duty of creating a debt or 
levying a tax to any person or body other 
than the corporate authorities of the 
county. Nor can the state compel a county 
to incur a debt or to levy a tax for the 
purpose named in the act without its 
consent. 
Id. at 106 3 (emphasis added). 
Standford thus stands for the principle that legisla-
tion violates the mandatory provisions of Article XIII, Section 5 
if it attempts to achieve a state purpose through local ad 
valorem taxation, a function exclusively reserved to the coun-
ties. 
The more recent Utah Supreme Court cases (decided after 
1940) confirm Standford's rationale by holding that Article XIII, 
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Section 5 is not violated as long as revenues from state taxing 
schemes are not being used to fund local county functions. 
For instance, in Tribe v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 
540 P.2d 499 (Utah 1975), the Utah Supreme Court upheld, against 
an Article XIII, Section 5 challenge, a statute that required a 
portion of property taxes to be diverted directly to help pay off 
revenue bonds issued by the Salt Lake City Redevelopment Agency 
to finance a redevelopment project. In dismissing the Article 
XIII, Section 5 claim the Tribe Court held "it needs only to be 
said that the law is well settled that in exercising the powers 
of the state the legislature may require the revenue of a munici-
pality, raised by taxation, to be applied to uses other than that 
for which the taxes were levied," Id. at 504 (emphasis added). 
It is important to emphasize the context in which the 
Tribe Court's commentary on Article XIII, Section 5 was made. 
The Court repeatedly stressed that the Salt Lake City Redevelop-
ment Agency, which issued tax allocation and parking revenue 
bonds, was "a quasi-municipal corporation, a public agency 
created for beneficial and necessary public purposes. "It is not 
a true municipal corporation, having power of local government, 
but an agency of the state designed for state purposes." Id. at 
503 (emphasis added). Since the agency was part of state govern-
ment, Article XIII, Section 5, which precludes state interference 
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with county taxation powers, did not apply. Given that distinc-
tion, the state in Tribe could require that state tax revenue 
collected by the county be applied to state purposes. The Tribe 
Court found that no further analysis of Article XIII, Section 5 
was necessary because the revenue expenditures were not for local 
county purposes. 
In Salt Lake County v. Murray City Redevelopment, 598 
P. 2d 1339 (Utah 1979), the Utah Supreme Court, specifically 
relying upon the Tribe decision, upheld a redevelopment act that, 
as Salt Lake County alleged, required diversions of taxes 
assessed by the county for county purposes to the defendant 
Murray City for Murray City redevelopment. Salt Lake County 
sought to distinguish Tribe on the basis that the statute at 
issue in Salt Lake County v. Murray City authorized the diversion 
of assessed taxes, normally accruing to the benefit of the 
county, from the county to Murray City; and further that such a 
diversion would shift the burden of paying for improvements from 
Murray City to Salt Lake County as a whole. Consequently, Salt 
Lake County claimed that it would be forced to increase its mill 
levy to compensate for lost revenues and that this constituted an 
imposition of taxes on Salt Lake County residents for Murray City 
purposes, contrary to the intent and language of Article XIII, 
Section 5. 
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The Court disagreed with Salt Lake County on a purely 
factual basis: 
[I]t should be noted that Salt Lake County 
will not lose its vested authority to 
'collect taxes for all purposes of such 
corporation' as provided in Article XIII, 
Section 5. Salt Lake County will not even 
be subordinated to the redevelopment agency 
in the collection of taxes. It will be 
held to the amount and proportion of tax 
revenues that it would have received had no 
redevelopment plan been adopted, and that 
amount will remain static for that period 
of time during which the bonds of redevel-
opment are being retired. 
Id. at 1342 (emphasis added and footnotes omitted). 
The Court further stressed, quoting Tribe, that the 
Murray City Redevelopment Agency was a quasi-municipal corpora-
tion, and not a special commission. Accordingly, the Murray City 
Redevelopment Agency: 
is an arm of the State government, designed 
for State purposes with powers granted by 
the Legislature separate and distinct from 
the municipality within whose territory it 
may be established. The Agency benefits 
the public at large by alleviating urban 
blight, which was also recognized by this 
Court in Tribe as a problem of statewide, 
not merely local concern. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
Thus, the Court in Salt Lake County v. Murray City 
Redevelopment avoided a constitutional impasse with Article XIII, 
Section 5 by finding as a factual matter that (1) the statutory 
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scheme Salt Lake County challenged did not impact its power to 
collect taxes; and that (2) the Redevelopment Agency was an arm 
of state government and thus could, if authorized by the legisla-
ture, raise revenue for state purposes. 
In its most recent analysis of Article XIII, Section 5, 
Baker v. Matheson, 607 P.2d 233 (Utah 1979), the Court followed 
this same rationale in upholding, as against an Article XIII, 
Section 5 challenge, a statute that authorized certain home 
owners and renters to file claims for refunds from the state 
general fund. The operative provisions of the challenged act 
permitted the "owner of a dwelling" and the "renter of a dwelling 
comprising a household" to file claims for refunds of "state 
general fund free revenue." The act's underlying purpose, as 
determined by the legislature and quoted Ln the opinion was: 
to provide for a refund of the excess of 
the free revenues in the state general fund 
on an equitable basis to those . . . who 
have experienced the primary impact of the 
increases in the property taxes, and 
increased living costs, this refund to be 
effectuated through payments from these 
free revenues and computed on the basis 
provided for in this section. 
Id. at 236 (emphasis in original). 
The Baker Court had little trouble in dismissing the 
Article XIII, Section 5 challenge since: 
the Act is not a taxing measure, and there 
simply is no substance to the proposition 
-22-
that the Act 'impose[s] taxes for the 
purposes of a county, city, town or other 
municipal corporation- . . . ' The Act 
makes no provision whatsoever for any 
payments to or for any county, city, town 
or municipal corporation. 
Id. at 241 (emphasis added). 
As with prior opinions, the Baker Court stressed that 
Article XIII, Section 5 only applied to state-compelled taxation 
for county purposes. The provision otherwise does not preclude 
state financing measures, such as those at issue in Tribe, Salt 
Lake County and Baker. 
2. The levy and collection of local ad valorem taxes 
is a county function, not a state function, even though the 
state, acting through the Tax Commission, must "assess" or value 
certain properties on a unitary basis. 
In State v. Eldredqe, 27 Utah 477, 76 P. 337 (1904) the 
Utah Supreme Court, again invoking Article XIII, Section 5, held 
that a statute giving the State Board of Equalization power to 
levy property taxes on property wholly located within one county 
was unconstitutional because that is an exclusive county func-
tion. In construing Article XIII, Section 5 the Eldredge Court 
commented: 
If the construction which the relator seeks 
to place upon that language of the Consti-
tution [(the language of Article XIII, 
Section 11 creating a State Board of 
Equalization and conferring upon it such 
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other duties as may be prescribed by law)] 
were to be adopted, then ther€> would seem 
to be no reason why the State Board, by 
legislative enactment, might not be autho-
rized to also levy and collect the taxes 
upon property situate wholly within one 
county, or to perform many of the other 
local duties which the legislature might 
see fit to impose upon the board. As will 
be noticed, this would clearly be in 
violation of section 5, art, 13, which 
directs the Legislature to vest in the 
corporate authorities the power to assess 
and collect taxes for local purposes. 
Id. at 340 (emphasis added). 
3. Article XIII, Section 5 precludes state interfer-
ence with county taxation. 
Consistent with the cases discussed above, which hold 
that ad valorem taxation is a county function, are cases which 
uphold a challenged statute under Article XIII, Section 5 because 
they do not involve taxation. 
For example, in Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake City, 42 
Utah 548, 124 P. 560 (1913) Salt Lake County (the "County") 
brought an action against Salt lake City to recover the costs of 
caring for, educating, and maintaining certain delinquent chil-
dren who were ordered by the juvenile court to be sent to a 
detention home maintained by the County. The County maintained 
the detention facility pursuant to state law which provided that 
upon the recommendation of the Juvenile Court Commission, the 
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Board of County Commissioners "shall establish . . . and maintain 
detention homes . . . . M The act further provided that the 
county establishing and maintaining such a detention home was 
entitled to recover from cities of the first and second class the 
support and maintenance costs. Salt Lake City contended that the 
law authorizing a county to recover against a city was unconsti-
tutional because, among other reasons, it violated Article XIII, 
Section 5. 
In discussing the act at issue, the Supreme Court 
stated, "What is sought to be accomplished by that law does not 
relate to the assessment or collection of taxes; nor does it 
regulate or attempt to regulate county or township officers." 
Id. at 563 (emphasis added). The Court continued to state that 
"What is required from Salt Lake City is required from it as an 
arm or agency of state government, and in no way affects or 
interferes with any of its functions as a municipal corporation 
governing its own local affairs." Id. (emphasis added). 
In its analysis of the Article XIII, Section 5 issue, 
the Court held that "[t]he Legislature in exercising sovereign 
powers of the state in our judgment had the right to require both 
Salt Lake county [sic] and Salt Lake City to each draw upon its 
general fund to defray the expenses of caring for and educating 
delinquent children who became wards of the juvenile court 
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. . . ." IcL at 564. The Court further held, "[W]e think that 
we have already made clear that the purpose to which the fund in 
question is sought to be applied is for general public good, and 
not for a private purpose; that such purpose is not one which 
pertains to the corporate powers or interest of Salt Lake City." 
Id. As explicitly recognized by the Court, Salt Lake County did 
not concern the imposition of taxes for county purposes and thus 
Article XIII, Section 5 was not violated. 
Later cases also interpret the proscriptions of Article 
XIII, Section 5 as limited to county taxation powers. In Bailey 
v. Van Dyke, 66 Utah 184, 240 P. 454 (1925) the Utah Supreme 
Court held that the Article XIII, Section 5 claim before it was: 
wholly insupportable because the statute in 
question does not impose any obligation 
whatever upon the county. The county is 
merely given legal power to enter into the 
contract and provide the funds or not, as 
its duly constituted officers may elect. 
There is no imposition of taxes, direct or 
indirect, by legislative authority upon the 
county, and no interference with local self 
government by the county. 
Id. at 457. (emphasis added). 
In The Best Foods v. Christensen, 75 Utah 392, 285 P. 
1001 (1930), the Utah Supreme Court upheld, against a challenge 
under Article XIII, Section 5, a statute that imposed a $5.00 
annual permit fee payable by the seller of oleomargarine to the 
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general fund of a county, city or town. Explicitly, in Best 
Foods, the Court avoided the Article XIII, Section 5 challenge, 
concurring with the defendant's contention that $5.00 fee "for a 
permit to sell oleomargarine is not a tax within the meaning of 
article 13, § 5, of our state Constitution." Id.. a t 1 0 0 2 
(emphasis added). 
In Smith v. Carbon County, 90 Utah 560, 63 P.2d 259 
(1936), the Utah Supreme Court held that, under Article I, 
Section 24 (mandating the "uniform operation" of all laws of a 
"general nature") a statute that provided for graduated "fees" in 
probate proceedings based upon the size of the estate was 
unconstitutional. 
The Smith Court raised the Article XIII, Section 5, 
issue sua sponte because it was "not argued in the briefs of 
counsel and therefore we refrain from answering it in the present 
opinion." ^d. at 262. Nonetheless, the Court in dicta declared: 
It is not necessary in the present case to 
consider what power, if any, the Legisla-
ture has to impose inheritance taxes for 
the use and benefits of counties because 
the fees provided for in the statute under 
review are not inheritance taxes. 
Id. (emphasis added.) 
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These cases are important because they stress that 
legislation which does not impact the levy and collection of ad 
valorem taxes does not offend Articles XIII, Section 5. 
Finally, while not binding on the Court, it is relevant 
that on February 11, 1988, the Utah Attorney General issued a 
Formal Opinion concluding that the Act does interfere with the 
local county functions of levying and collecting taxes and is 
thus unconstitutional. Formal Opinion No, 88-01, Feb. 11, 1988* 
Record 14-29. In this Formal Opinion, the Attorney General 
concludes that Utah Code Ann. § 17-19-15 violates Article XIII, 
Section 5 because the provisions of the Act "mandate" that 
counties: 1) collect taxes for their own use; 2) share their tax 
revenues with other counties regardless of their consent; and 
3) submit to the other described state controls. Formal Opinion 
No. 88-01, p. 11 (emphasis added). Record at 25. 
B. The Constitution Prohibits a State Levy for County 
Purposes Even if a Concomitant Statewide Purpose is Being 
Furthered. 
Article I, Section 2 of the Utah Constitution sets 
forth that w[a]ll political power is inherent in the people." 
The state Constitution therefore serves as a limitation on the 
exercise of the sovereign power of the state inherent in the 
people, and the state legislature must, accordingly, operate 
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within those constitutional limits. The essence of the 
Coalition's argument in this case is that Utah Code Ann. 
§ 17-19-15 attempts to do what the Constitution prohibits; thus 
it is unconstitutional, irrespective of any concomitant statewide 
purpose that might be furthered. 
Article XIII, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution does 
not grant authority but constrains authority. Once again, the 
proscription is that the "Legislature shall not impose taxes for 
the purpose of any county, city, town or other municipal corpora-
tion, but may, by law, vest in the corporate authorities thereof, 
respectively, the power to assess and collect taxes for all 
purposes of such corporation. . . . " (Emphasis added.) 
In other words, the state legislature cannot levy taxes 
for the purposes of any county for any reason. This restriction 
is not conditional. "The terms of the constitution are made 
mandatory and prohibitory unless expressly declared to be other-
wise. " State v. Standford, supra at 1063 (emphasis added). 
Consequently, a state cannot levy for county purposes in 
6
 It is relevant to note that Article XIII, Section 5 specifi-
cally allows one exception to its proscription, which is that 
counties may share their revenues with other counties if they so 
consent. Therefore, if the intent of the Constitution was that 
Article XIII, Section 5 would not apply if a concomitant state 
purpose was being furthered, the constitutional framers would 
have logically included this exception as well. 
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disregard of a constitutional restraint on the pretext that a 
concomitant statewide purpose is being furthered. 
In a recent decision, this Court, following a similar 
principle, rejected the argument that a statute furthering a 
state purpose can ignore a constitutional prohibition. In Utah 
Technology Finance Corporation v. Wilkinson, 723 P.2d 406 (Utah 
1986) the Utah Technology Finance Corporation ("UTFC"), as 
established by the Utah Technology and Innovation Act, had 
committed one million dollars of public funds to subscribe to 
stock, indirectly, in selected businesses. The Attorney General 
argued that the Utah Technology and Innovation Act violated 
Article VI, Section 29 of the Utah Constitution which prohibits 
the state from "subscribing] to stock or bonds in aid of any 
. . . corporate enterprise- or undertaking." UTFC sought judicial 
approbation on the ground that the legislature has found the 
subscription of stock in fledging businesses to have a public 
purpose. Rl. at 413. This Court responded: 
[T]he legislature's findings of a public 
purpose are of no avail in this instance. 
The constitutional convention in promulgating 
section 29 and its subsequent adoption by the 
electorate of this state have foreclosed any 
speculation or further debate on that issue. 
Whether the public benefits thereby is of no 
consequence. This means of assistance is 
forbidden by section 29. The state is 
foreclosed from subscribing, even though the 
legislature may determine that public bene-
fits will flow therefrom. 
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Id. at 413-414. 
This same rule applies to this case. A statute that 
violates a constitutional prohibition cannot be validated by 
finding that a statewide purpose is served. Regardless of the 
merits of a statute and any potential public good it may accom-
plish, if that statute intrudes upon the Constitution it must 
fail. The Act is unconstitutional because it transgresses a 
specific constitutional provision. 
C. Utah Code Ann. § 17-19-15 Is a State Tax Being 
Levied For County Purposes. 
In its Memorandum Decision, the district court upheld 
the constitutionality of the Act, in part, on the finding that 
the Act "does not on its face dictate to the counties that they 
shall impose taxes for some specific county purpose." Record at 
296. This is incorrect. The Act specifically provides that the 
revenues generated from the "mandatory statewide tax rate" will 
be used to offset "all costs incurred in the assessment, collec-
tion, and distribution of property taxes and related appraisal 
programs." Utah Code Ann. § 17-19-15(1), (3) and (5). It is the 
duty, responsibility, and constitutional right of each county to 
have exclusive control and domain over inherently county pur-
poses. Article XIII, Section 5 provides that the power to assess 
and collect taxes for all county purposes may be delegated to the 
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individual counties, and the state itself cannot exercise such 
powers- State v. Eldredqe, supra at 340. The Court stressed 
this point by interpreting Article XIII, Section 5 as vesting the 
levy and collection of ad valorem taxes with the counties as an 
exclusive county function, for county purposes, which authority 
cannot be assumed or delegated to others. State v. Standford, 
supra at 1062. Thus the costs, expenses, salaries of county 
officials, etc. involved in the assessment, collection, and levy 
of ad valorem property taxes are expenses and costs specifically 
7 
related to county purposes. 
In an effort to prove that the Act does not impose a 
tax for a "county purpose," the County defendants have referred 
to the Tax Commission's various supervisory powers and duties 
over counties. The County defendants then argue that the Tax 
Commission's statutory duties are circumscribed within the 
general constitutional duty to "review proposed bond issues, 
revise the tax levies of local governmental units, and equalize 
the assessment and valuation of property within the counties." 
Article XIII, § 11. From these and other such duties, the County 
defendants conclude that "the legislature and the Tax Commission 
7
 See 106 A.L.R. 906 (1937) for a discussion and description 
of other expenses and costs incurred by a county/local municipal-
ity that are related to local purposes. 
-32-
have, to a large degree, completely assume[d] control of the 
local administration of the property tax system." Record at 180. 
The County defendants exhaustive recitation of the Tax 
Commission's supervisory duties appears to advance the following 
logic: (1) the Tax Commission, by statute and constitutional 
mandate, has general supervisory control over the counties* 
assessment, collection and equalization functions; (2) the Act is 
a legislative attempt at equalization; and, (3) therefore, the 
Act is within the constitutional framework of the Tax 
Commission's duties. 
The fatal flaw in this logic lies in the second 
premise. It is an unwarranted and unsupported logical leap to 
assume that because the Tax Commission has general supervisory 
powers over equalization and assessment that it also has equiva-
lent powers over county authority to levy taxes. The Court 
should decline to make that leap for two reasons. 
First, Utah Supreme Court cases interpreting Article 
XIII, Section 5 make it indisputably clear that the levy of ad 
valorem taxes is a county function, for county purposes which 
cannot be assumed by or delegated to others. State v. Standford, 
supra at 1062. Further the Standford Court stated that " [u]nder 
the constitution the state has no power to make a disposition of 
county funds, and require that they be appropriated for other and 
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different purposes than those for which by authority of the 
county they were collected," id. at 1063- Standford also held 
that the state could not "compel a county to incur a debt or to 
levy a tax . . . without its consent." I^d. 
As discussed above, the Utah Supreme Court in State v. 
Eldredge, invoking Article XIII, Section 5, held that a statute 
giving the State Board of Equalization (the predecessor to the 
Utah State Tax Commission) power to assess property wholly 
located within one county was unconstitutional, notwithstanding 
the Board's general supervisory powers. In construing Article 
XIII, Section 5, the Eldredge Court stated, as extensively quoted 
earlier, that the State Board of Education could not levy and 
collect taxes on property wholly situated within one county: 
As will be noticed, this would clearly be in 
violation of section 5, art. 13, which 
directs the Legislature to vest in the 
corporate authorities the power to assess and 
collect taxes for local purposes. 
Id. at 340 (emphasis added). 
Eldredge, therefore, is authority that - whatever the 
oversight responsibilities of state taxing authorities - state 
power over the taxing function of local governments stops far 
short of the actual levy and collection of a tax. By constitu-
tional mandate, the levy and collection of an ad valorem tax is a 
county function. The Act, by vesting the power to impose local 
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ad valorem taxes in state officials, unconstitutionally intrudes 
upon the role of county government. If that is not so, and the 
Tax Commission and other state officials can impose local ad 
valorem taxes and redistribute collected taxes to other counties, 
Article XIII, Section 5 proscribes nothing, and is meaningless. 
This result runs afoul of this Court's consistently repeated 
doctrine that statutory enactments that contravene constitutional 
provisions are void even though they are arguably meritorious. 
See, e.g., Rio Algom Corporation v. San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184 
(Utah 1984) and Dean v. Rampton, 556 P.2d 205 (Utah 1976). 
Second, most of the Tax Commission's supervisory 
control over counties does not relate to the levy of local ad 
valorem taxes. Because Article XIII, Section 5 addresses only ad 
valorem taxation by counties, many of the County defendants' 
arguments below - no more than a laundry list of state supervi-
sory controls over various county functions - are irrelevant. 
For example, the County defendants rely upon the statutory 
financing scheme for the Uniform School Fund to bootstrap an 
argument that the Act is constitutional. Specifically, the 
argument is "the method of financing an effective and economic 
statewide system of property tax assessment, collection and 
distribution was closely modeled on the finance mechanism for the 
state supported minimum school program (Uniform School Fund). 
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See Utah Code Ann. § 53-7-1 et seg. (1953, as amended)." Record 
at 183. 
This argument is unavailing because statewide taxes to 
support public education stand upon an entirely different consti-
tutional footing (Article X, Section 1) than do state imposed ad 
valorem taxes. "[A] legislative scheme requiring taxes to be 
collected by counties for the benefit of school districts has 
been distinguished from a scheme requiring taxes to be collected 
by counties for their own use." Attorney General, Formal Opinion 
No. 88-01, February 11, 1988 (citing Board of Education v. 
Burqon, 62 Utah 162, 217 P. 1112 (1923) and Board of Education v. 
Daines, 50 Utah 97, 166 P. 977 (1917)), Record at 19-20. The 
County defendants' position, that the funding mechanism for 
public schools required under Article X, Section 1 amounts to the 
same thing as a taxation scheme prohibited under Article XIII, 
Section 5, is obviously wrong. 
The same observation applies to the County defendants' 
recitation of law enforcement, assessingf and other local func-
tions subject to state supervision. It does not save the Act 
(exclusively concerned with local ad valorem taxation) to argue 
that county sheriffs must serve all process when the state is a 
party; or that county attorneys must conduct on behalf of the 
state all prosecution for public offenses within the counties; or 
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that county assessors are supervised by the Tax Commission. See 
Record at 199. The Act violates Article XIII, Section 5 because 
state officials, not county officials, set the levy for local ad 
valorem taxes intended to cover collection costs, and the power 
of taxation is wrenched from the county, where it constitution-
ally resides, and is transferred to state officers and entities. 
As this Court stated in Best Foods; 
There can be no doubt but that the farmers of 
our state Constitution recognized the rights 
of the people of Utah to local 
self-government. It was to preserve local 
self-government free from needless legisla-
tive interference that the power to levy 
taxes for local purposes was by the state 
Constitution vested exclusively in the proper 
authority of counties, cities, towns, and 
other municipal corporations. The power to 
collect and control the revenues of a munici-
pality is of the very essence of local 
self-government. 
Best Foods, supra at 1003. 
III. THE ACT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY MANDATES REVENUE 
SHARING. 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-19-15 provides for a mandatory 
statewide tax which results in the forced sharing of county 
revenues. Forced revenue sharing is prohibited by Article XIII, 
Section 5. As discussed above, this Court has held that "[u]nder 
the constitution the state has no power to make a disposition of 
county funds, and require that they be appropriated for other and 
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different purposes than those for which by authority of the 
county they were collected." State v. Standford, supra at 1063. 
The district court erred in holding that the Act does 
not force revenue sharing for three reasons. First, the district 
court misinterpreted Utah Code Ann. § 17-19-15 as providing for 
consensual sharing. In its Memorandum Decision, the district 
court stated: 
An evaluation of the language contained in 
Section 17-19-15, merely provides that 
where counties generate proceeds in excess 
of budgeted amounts that are the result of 
a uniform statewide levy, that those excess 
funds may be diverted to other counties in 
conformity with the funding programs in the 
spirit of the statewide purpose of unifor-
mity of assessment in valuation. 
Record at 297 (emphasis added). 
The district court stated that counties "may" share 
revenues. The fact of the matter is that revenues received in 
excess of certified budgets "shall be transmitted to the state 
treasurer for equalization and distribution." Id. § 17-19-15(6) 
(emphasis added). The counties do not have the option of 
withholding excess revenues. The counties do not have the option 
of not participating in the sharing scheme of the Act. This is 
8
 The Utah Attorney General stated that the Act "mandatefs] 
that counties collect taxes for their own use." Record at 25 
(emphasis added). 
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clearly a mandatory revenue sharing scheme and is 
unconstitutional. 
Second, the district court erred in holding that "even 
if this statutory provision mandated revenue sharing, it would 
not be offensive to Article XIII, Section 5, because the counties 
do so voluntarily.- Record at 298. If the statute "mandated 
revenue sharing" the district court should have stopped its 
inquiry at that point for mandatory revenue sharing would on its 
face be unconstitutional and no action by the counties can 
legalize an illegal act. Utah Technology Finance Corporation, 
supra. 
Furthermore, even if the statute provided for consen-
sual sharing, the counties have not taken the necessary proce-
dural steps to authorize such sharing. The informal actions of 
county officials, or vote of unofficial associations (no legal 
status under the Utah Constitution or statutes) are not actions 
which meet the procedural requirements necessary to authorize 
valid county action. 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-4-2 provides that a county must 
exercise its power "only by board of county commissioners or by 
agents and officers acting under authority of the board or 
authority of law." Utah Code Ann. § 11-13-16.5 states: 
Any county, city, town or other local politi-
cal subdivision may, at the discretion of the 
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local governing body, share its tax and other 
revenues with other counties, cities, towns 
or other local political subdivision. Any 
decision to share tax and other revenues 
shall be by local ordinance, resolution, or 
interlocal agreement. 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-19-15, with its mandatory revenue 
sharing, is a state statute, not a local ordinance, resolution or 
interlocal agreement. Moreover, the counties have not provided, 
by affidavit or otherwise, any local ordinance, resolution, or 
other interlocal agreement between counties by which revenue 
raised through ad valorem taxation will be shared. 
Finally, the fact that Article XIII, Section 5 was 
amended in 1983 to provide for the consensual sharing of county 
revenues reinforces the conclusion that the Act violates the 
constitution in requiring mandatory revenue sharing. As the 
title of the resolution proposing the amendment that became 
Q 
effective in 1983 indicates, revenue sharing may be permitted, 
if a county consents. Anything short of permissive sharing; i.e. 
mandatory sharing, is unconstitutional. 
9
 "PROVIDING FOR PERMISSIVE SHARING OF REVENUES BETWEEN 
POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS OF THE STATE." S.J.R. No. 3, Tax Article 
Revision, 1982 Budget Session, Utah State Legislature (emphasis 
added). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Utah Code Ann. § 17-19-15 
violates Article XIII, Section 5 of the Constitution of the State 
of Utah and thus is unconstitutional. Accordingly the district 
court erred in granting summary judgment to the County defendants 
and the decision of the district court should be reversed with 
instructions to enter summary judgment for the Coalition. 
DATED this 28th day of December, 1989. 
)rty^ 
JAMESBTLEE 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KENNECOTT CORPORATION, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
et al., 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. C-88-3457 
Before the Court are reciprocal Motions for Partial Summary 
Judgment, and other related reciprocal Motions to Strike various 
supporting Affidavits and/or attached exhibits. The Motions for 
Summary Judgment deal with the constitutionality of Section 17-
19-15, Utah Code Ann., 1953 as amended. Prior to oral argument, 
the parties,- through their respective counsel, filed extensive 
Memoranda of law. The parties, through their counsel, also 
appeared and orally argued their respective positions. Following 
oral argument, the Court took the matter under advisement to 
further consider the legal authorities cited by the parties, and 
to consider counsel's oral presentations. The Court has now 
reviewed the authorities cited by the parties, and has evaluated 
the legal positions of both parties, and being otherwise fully 
advised, enters the following Memorandum Decision. 
KENNECOTT V. TAX COMM. PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
As indicated above, the respective Motions for Partial 
Summary Judgment are directed to the plaintiffs1 First Cause of 
Action as contained in plaintiffs1 Complaint. Plaintiff asserts 
that Section 17-19-15, Utah Code Ann., 1953 as amended, 
(hereinafter 17-19-15), is unconstitutional because the statute 
violates the provisions outlined in Article XIII, Section 5, of 
the Utah Constitution. Defendants, on the other hand, assert 
that the statutory requirements of Section 17-19-15, are not in 
violation of Article XIII, Section 5, and therefore seek a 
determination that the statute and its mandates are 
constitutional. 
Intertwined in the respective Motions for Partial Summary 
Judgment are plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Affidavits as not 
relevant, and defendants' Motion to Strike an Exhibit dealing 
with a similar action pending before the Honorable Don V. Tibbs, 
District Court Judge, Sixth Judicial District Court. 
Dealing first with the Motion to Strike, the Court declines 
to strike either the Affidavits or the Exhibits. Those documents 
will stand and be considered for any probative value that they 
may have. Accordingly, both the plaintiffs' and defendants1 
Motions to Strike are denied. 
Turning to the merits of the reciprocal Motions for Partial 
Summary Judgment, the Court's examination must focus on the 
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pronouncements of Section 17-19-15, to determine whether or not 
those requirements constitute a levying of taxes by the state for 
county purposes. If Section 17-19-15, evidences such, then the 
statute runs afoul of the Constitution and cannot stand. 
Section 17-19-15, reads as follows: 
Separate budget for costs of assessing, collecting, and 
distributing property taxes — Submission to state 
auditor for review — Allowable costs established by 
rule — Transmission to tax commission — Limitations 
on tax rate — Exceptions — Adjustments. 
(1) To promote appraisal and equalization of 
property values and effective collection and 
distribution of property tax proceeds, the county 
governing body of each county shall annually separately 
budget for all costs incurred in the assessment, 
collection, and distribution of property taxes and 
related appraisal programs and submit those budgets to 
the state auditor for review. 
(2) The state auditor shall establish, by rule, 
categories of allowable costs and shall certify 
submitted budgets for compliance with approved 
categories. 
(3) Upon review and certification by the state 
auditor-, the aggregated statewide costs shall be 
transmitted to the State Tax Commission for 
determination of a mandatory statewide tax rate 
sufficient to meet those expenditures. By June 8 of 
each year the tax commission shall certify the rate to 
each county auditor for inclusion upon the tax notice 
as a separately listed and identified local levy. 
(4) The tax rate may not exceed a maximum of 
.0005 per dollar of taxable value of taxable property 
except for: (a) mandated or formally adopted 
reappraisal programs conforming to tax commission 
rules; or (b) actions required to meet legislative, 
judicial, or administrative orders. Taxes levied for 
this purpose may not be included in determining the 
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maximum allowable levy for the county or any other 
taxing district. 
(5) In the initial year that the levy adopted 
under this section is effective, each taxing district 
within counties which had not previously levied 
separate assessing, collecting, and distributing 
levies, shall reduce its property tax levy by an amount 
equal to that paid by the taxing district in the 
previous year for the cost of assessing, collecting, 
and distributing taxes. 
(6) Revenues received by each county from the 
levy authorized by this section in excess of the amount 
set out in the certified budget shall be transmitted to 
the state treasurer for equalization and distribution 
to the counties in accordance with the certified 
budgets. Any revenue excess resulting from an increase 
in collection rates upon final settlement shall be 
deposited by the state treasurer in a trust account to 
be adjusted against subsequent years. 
Article XIII, Section 5, of the Utah Constitution, reads as 
follows: 
The Legislature shall not impose taxes for the 
purpose of any county, city, town or other municipal 
corporation, but may, by law, vest in the corporate 
authorities thereof, respectively, but power to assess 
and collect taxes for all purposes of such corporation. 
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in 
this Constitution, political subdivisions may share 
their taxes and other revenues with other political 
subdivisions as provided by statute. 
In approaching a decision regarding the constitutionality or 
lack thereof of any legislative enactment, the accepted criteria 
for evaluation is that there should be a presumption of 
constitutionality. On the other hand, the Court has the duty to 
carefully examine the contested statute to insure that the final 
word of the people, as contained in the Constitution is adhered 
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to by their elected representatives. It is not the role of the 
courts to examine the merits or lack of merits of any particular 
legislation. The responsibility of determining what is 
appropriate public policy is deposited with the legislative 
branch of government, and is not a function of the judiciary to 
examine the merits of challenged legislation in determining 
whether or not the challenge is sufficient. In the final 
analysis, either the statute passes constitutional muster, or it 
does not. 
Article XIII, Section 5, prohibits the legislature from 
imposing taxes for purposes of any county, city, town or the 
like, but does not prohibit the legislature to allow by statute 
local governments to levy taxes for their own purposes. Section 
5 goes on to note that the legislature may provide by statute for 
local government to share their tax revenue. Likewise, Article 
XIII, Section 5, does not prohibit the legislature from requiring 
the counties to impose taxes for state purposes, as opposed to 
county purposes. 
The pivotal issue then is whether or not Section 17-19-15 is 
in actuality the legislature directing the county to levy taxes 
for county purposes, or whether or not the statutory enactment 
merely requires the county to impose taxes for a state or 
statewide purpose. 
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The reason and basis for Article XIII, Section 5, of the 
Utah Constitution seems to be clear to this Court. Remote state 
officials should not force local elected officials to levy taxes 
for what state officials think might be necessary local 
functions. What is needed, or what is not needed, in government, 
public facilities, and the like at the county level should be 
decided by county officials who are closest to the situation and 
closest to the needs of the local citizens. 
Section 17-19-15, does not on its face dictate to the 
counties that they shall impose taxes for some specific county 
purpose. The purpose and the requirements of Section 17-19-15, 
is directed to a statewide purpose. It is not the mere fact that 
state officials or other parties interested in maintaining the 
constitutionality of the section state that it is for a statewide 
purpose, but rather an examination of the provisions of the 
statute and what it accomplishes lead this Court to the 
conclusion that the purposes are statewide in scope. 
The bases for determining that Section 17-19-15, is for a 
statewide purpose are clearly articulated in the Memorandum of 
the defendants, and no good purpose would be served here in 
restating those arguments. Suffice it to say that the Court 
finds those arguments persuasive, and adopts them as the basis 
for this Court's determination that the purposes of the contested 
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statute are for statewide purposes, as opposed to county 
purposes. 
Based on the foregoing, the Court determines that Section 
17-19-15, is in furtherance of resolving a matter of statewide 
concern, and as such is constitutional under Article XIII, 
Section 5, of the Utah Constitution. 
Plaintiffs further contend that the revenue redistribution 
aspect of the funding mechanism established by Section 17-19-15, 
also violates Article XIII, Section 5, of the Utah Constitution 
by mandating revenue sharing between the counties. The 
plaintiffs argue that Article XIII, Section 5, only provides for 
consensual revenue sharing. 
An evaluation of the language contained in Section 17-19-15, 
merely provides that where counties generate proceeds in excess 
of budgeted amounts that are the result of a uniform statewide 
tax levy, that those excess funds may be diverted to other 
counties in conformity with the funding programs in the spirit of 
the statewide purpose of uniformity of assessment in valuation. 
The Court also concludes that the only entities that have 
standing to complain would be the counties through their elected 
representatives, which is not the case here. To the contrary, 
the counties resist the interpretation of Section 17-19-15, 
asserted by the plaintiffs. If individual taxpayers have 
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displeasure with the official position of the county, their 
remedy is with the elected county officials. The Court also 
notes that the Utah Association of Counties, the Utah League of 
Cities and Towns, and the Utah State School Board Associations 
have supported on behalf of its members Section 17-19-15 which is 
complained of by the plaintiffs. Accordingly, even if this 
statutory provision mandated revenue sharing, it would not be 
offensive to Article XIII, Section 5, because the counties do so 
voluntarily. 
The Court is satisfied that Article XIII, Section 5, does 
not prohibit the distribution of local revenues to effect a 
statewide purpose. The procedure outlined in Section 17-19-15, 
is a permissible extension of legislative authority dealing with 
a matter of statewide interest. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court determines that the 
position of the defendants regarding the interrelationship 
between Article XIII, Section 5, and Section 17-19-15, is 
appropriate, and grants the defendants1 Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment. 
Counsel for the defendants are to prepare an appropriate 
Order in accordance with this Memorandum Decision, and submit the 
KENNECOTT V. TAX COMM. PAGE NINE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
same to the Court for review and signature in conformity with the 
Code of Judicial Administration. 
Dated this // dav of/April/ 1989. 
10THY R. HANSON 
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IN THE TAX DIVISION OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
KENNECOTT CORPORATION, MORTON 
THIOKOL, INC., BARRICK RESOURCES 
(USA) INC., and HERCULES, 
INCORPORATED, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
R. HAL HANSEN, Chairman of the 
Utah State Tax Commission, 
ROGER 0. TEW, Utah State Tax 
Commissioner, JOE B. PACHECO, 
Utah State Tax Commissioner, 
G. BLAINE DAVIS, Utah State 
Tax Commissioner, TOM L. ALLEN, 
Utah State Auditor, EDWARD T. 
ALTER, Utah State Treasurer, 
ARTHUR L. MONSON, Salt Lake 
County Treasurer; and GRANT L. 
PENDLETON, Tooele County 
Treasurer, 
Defendants. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, FINAL 
ORDER AND CERTIFICATION 
Civil No. 88-3457 
Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
* * * * * * * * 
Before the Court are reciprocal motions for partial 
summary judgment and other related reciprocal motions to strike 
various supporting affidavits and attached exhibits. The parties 
filed extensive memoranda, appeared through their counsel and 
argued orally. Plaintiffs appeared by and through their attor-
neys, Maxwell A. Miller and Kent W. Winterholler. Defendants 
appeared by and through their attorneys, Bill Thomas Peters, 
special Deputy Salt Lake County and Tooele County attorney, and 
Karl Hendricksen, Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney. 
The Court, having heard the arguments of counsel, and 
having considered legal authorities and memoranda filed by the 
parties, issued its Memorandum Decision on the above-stated 
motions on April 11, 1989. Based on that Memorandum Decision, 
and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, the Court 
hereby enters the following Summary Judgment and Final Order. 
1. The Court rules that plaintiffs lack standing to 
contest the constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. S 17-19-15 (1987) 
under Article XIII, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution. 
2. The Court rules that Utah Code Ann. $ 17-19-15 
(1987) is in furtherance of resolving a matter of statewide 
concern, and as such, is constitutional under Article, XIII 
Section 5 of the Utah Constitution. 
3. The Court rules that the revenue distribution 
aspect of the funding mechanism established by Utah Code Ann. S 
17-19-15 (1987) does not mandate revenue sharing between coun-
ties, and, therefore, does not violate that provision of Article 
XIII, Section 5 which permits only consensual revenue sharing. 
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4. Based on the foregoing, the Court denies plain-
tiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
5. The Court grants defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment as it pertains to the constitutionality of Utah Code 
Ann. S 17-19-15 (1987) under Article XIII, Section 5 of the Utah 
Constitution. 
6. The Court denies defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment as it pertains to plaintiffs' Second, Third and Fourth 
Causes of Action. 
7. The Court denies the parties' respective motions 
to strike. 
8. The Court dismisses plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, 
with respect to its First Cause of Action, with prejudice. 
Based upon the foregoing Summary Judgment and Final 
Order, and pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the Court makes the following Certification. 
9. The Court rules that there are multiple parties in 
the present action and that plaintiffs' Amended Complaint raises 
multiple claims. 
10. The Court rules that the Summary Judgment entered 
herein is a final order, wholly disposes of plaintiffs' First 
Cause of Action, and would be appealable but for the presence of 
plaintiffs' remaining claims. 
-3-
11. The Court determines and certifies that there is 
no just reason to delay the plaintiffs from taking an appeal from 
the present Summary Judgment and Final Order. 
DATED this day of May, 1989. 
<Y THE COURT: 
HONORABLE TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
Third District Court Judge 
Tax Division 
239:050589A 
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IN THE TAX DIVISION OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KENNECOTT CORPORATION, MORTON 
THIOKOL, INC., BARRICK RESOURCES 
(USA) INC., and HERCULES, 
INCORPORATED, 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
R. HAL HANSEN, Chairman of the 
Utah State Tax Commission 
ROGER 0. TEW, Utah State Tax 
Commissioner, JOE B. PACHECO, 
Utah State Tax Commissioner, 
G. BLAINE DAVIS, Utah State 
Tax Commissioner, TOM L. ALLEN, 
Utah State Auditor, EDWARD T. 
ALTER, Utah State Treasurer, 
ARTHUR L. MONSON, Salt Lake 
County Treasurer; and GRANT L. 
PENDLETON, Tooele County 
Treasurer, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANTS' CROSS-MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Civil No. 88-3457 
Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
Arthur L. Monson, Salt Lake County Treasurer, and 
Grant L. Pendleton, Tooele County Treasurer, by and through 
their attorney, submit the following Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Response to Plaintiffs1 Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment. 
INTRODUCTION 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
Except for the limited role of the State Tax Commis-
sion in assessing certain multi-county or specifically designat-
ed properties, valuation for ad valorem taxation is accomplished 
in the State of Utah through local county officials in each of 
the twenty-nine counties. To suggest, however, that because 
functions are reposed within the statutory portfolios of locally 
elected officials and financed partially or totally by county 
general fund revenues ignores the significant historical role 
which the State Legislature and State Tax Commission have played 
in all local assessment issues. Article XIII, Section 11, 
Constitution of Utah, establishes a State Tax Commission and 
provides specifically that: 
"under such regulations in such cases and 
within such limitations as the Legislature may 
prescribe it shall review proposed bond 
issues, revise the tax levies of local govern-
mental units, and equalize the assessment and 
valuation of property within the counties." 
(Emphasis added.) 
The same constitutional provision gives the State Tax 
Commission power to regulate and control local County Boards of 
Equalization and local elected officials with respect to taxa-
tion matters. Utah Code Ann. §59-1-210, 1953, as amended, 
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grants sweeping control to the Tax Commission over local county 
taxing matters. Specifically, it may "adopt rules and pol-
icies, ••to govern county boards and officers in the performance 
of any duty relating to assessment, equalization and collection 
of taxes" [§59-1-210(3)], "prescribe the use of forms relating 
to the assessment of property and the equalization of those 
assessments" [§59-1-210(4)], and "administer and supervise the 
tax laws of the state" [§59-1-210(5)]. Additionally it may: 
"exercise general supervision over assessors 
and county boards of equalization and over 
other county officers in the performance of 
their duties relating to the assessment of 
property and collection of taxes so that all 
assessments of property are just and equal, 
according to fair market value, and that the 
tax burden is distributed without favor or 
discrimination" [§59-1-210(7)] . 
It may "confer with, advise and direct county treasur-
ers, assessors and other county officers in matters relating to 
the assessment and equalization of property for taxation and the 
collection of taxes" [§59-1-210(9)]. Finally, to enforce its 
complete supervisory control over the local property tax process 
it may "cause complaints to be made in the proper court seeking 
removal from office of assessors, auditors, members of county 
boards and other assessing, taxing, or disbursing officers who 
are guilty of official misconduct or neglect of duty" 
[§59-1-210(12)]. As part of its investigative responsibility to 
the Commission is charged with the power to: 
"investigate and direct the work and methods 
of local assessors and other officials in the 
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assessment, equalization, and taxation of 
property, and to ascertain whether the law 
requiring the assessment of all property not 
exempt from taxation, and the collection of 
taxes, have been properly administered and 
enforced." [§59-1-210(19)]. 
This comprehensive grant of regulatory authority and 
state control over all assessment and collection practices 
within the counties of the State is also evidenced by several 
specific statutory enactments relating to the performance of 
those duties. Chapter 2 of Title 59, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as 
amended) provides a comprehensive statutory framework with 
regard to time frames, procedures, standards and methods under 
which local assessors, treasurers, auditors, and County Boards 
of Equalization must function. The Legislature and Tax Commis-
sion have, to a large degree, completely assume control of the 
local administration of the property tax system. 
Consistent with the Constitutional requirement for the 
fair, equitable and accurate assessment of all property in the 
State (Utah Const. Art. XIII §3) , the Tax Commission has been 
constitutionally and statutorily mandated to equalize the 
valuations of the various counties for purposes of guaranteeing 
equitable assessment levels in financing the Uniform School 
Fund. The revenues of that fund are derived to a large degree 
from a uniform statewide tax levy imposed by local school 
districts. To further state equalization and uniformity of 
assessment, the Utah State Legislature, in 1969, established 
comprehensive programs of assessor certification and examination 
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and a statewide re-appraisal program with costs to be shared 
between counties and the State Tax Commission. This program was 
designed to provide for re-appraisal of all taxable property in 
each county every five years on a county-by-county basis. The 
Legislature also implemented a program of personal property 
auditing conducted by the State Tax Commission with cost sharing 
by the counties. See generally, Laws of Utah 1969, Chapter 179, 
Section 1 through 6, [Codified as Utah Code Ann. §59-5-106 
through 111 (1953, as amended)]. 
In 1981, the re-appraisal program created in 1969 was 
repealed by the Utah State Legislature, (Laws of Utah 1981, 
Chapter 233, Section 2.) In its place was substituted a compre-
hensive program of sales-assessment ratio studies to be conduct-
ed by the State Tax Commission. The provisions relating to 
certification of county assessors, education and training 
programs conducted by the Tax Commission, personal property 
audits and assessment-sales ratio studies are currently codified 
at Utah Code Ann. §59-2-701 through 705 (1953, as amended.) 
With respect to the assessment-sales ratio responsibility of the 
State Tax Commission, Utah Code Ann. §59-2-704 (1953, as amend-
ed) provides, in pertinent part, that upon completion of the 
study by the Tax Commission: 
"The Commission shall before the fourth 
Tuesday of November of each even numbered year 
beginning in 1984 order each county to adjust 
or factor its assessment rates using the most 
current studies so that the assessment rate in 
each county is in accordance with that 
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prescribed in §59-2-103. Adjustment or 
factoring may include an entire county, 
geological areas within a county, and separate 
classes or property. The Commission shall 
also order corrective action where significant 
value deviations occur." (Emphasis added.) 
Accordingly as part of the comprehensive State policy 
with respect to equal and uniform assessments, the Tax Commis-
sion has been given authority to order adjustments to values and 
even order corrective action (re-appraisal) when significant 
value deviations occur. 
Finally, as part of its effort to guarantee accuracy 
of assessment for purposes of equality within the equalized tax 
levy supporting the Uniform School Fund, the Legislature in 1977 
(Laws of Utah, 1977, Chapter 22, Sections 1 through 4) provided 
that uniform minimum standards for real property plat maps used 
by counties for property tax assessments would be established by 
a separate committee chaired by a member of the State Tax 
Commission. The statutes provide that all plat maps prepared by 
local elected county recorders and assessors must conform to 
those standards and that the counties would be reimbursed for 
the cost of correcting existing plats. The importance of this 
activity and its relevance to the support of the Uniform School 
Fund were deemed sufficient to justify the enactment of Utah 
Code Ann. §59-5-114, now codified at Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-318 
(1952, as amended), which stated: 
Cost of preparation of revised plats are to be 
borne by the Commission and appropriated from 
the Uniform School fund to the Property Tax 
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Division of the Commission for distribution to 
the various counties...(Emphasis added.) 
Thus, the Legislature clearly established that equali-
ty of assessment between counties was of such statewide concern 
that an equalized statewide levy should be used to pay for the 
services. This financing mechanism is identical to that chal-
lenged by the plaintiffs in the instant case. 
The Act presented for the court's review is the 
culmination of five years concerted legislative activity and 
litigation of cities, school districts and counties. See 
generally Board of Education v. Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d 1030 
(Utah 1983) , and Boards of Education of Granite, Murray and Salt 
Lake School Districts v. Salt Lake County Commission, et al., 
Appeal No. 19814 (Decided February 1, 1988). In an attempt to 
resolve and/or eliminate continuing litigation over the appor-
tionment of the costs of assessing, collecting and distributing 
property taxes, the statewide financing mechanism currently 
under attack in the instant case was duly enacted by the Utah 
State Legislature as S.B. 151. The method of financing an 
effective and economic statewide system of property tax assess-
ment, collection and distribution was closely modeled on the 
financing mechanism for the State supported minimum school 
program (Uniform School Fund). See Utah Code Ann. §53-7-1 et 
seq. (1953, as amended.) 
Under the uniform statewide tax administration levy, 
local county governing bodies established budgets for assessing, 
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collecting and distributing property taxes, categorized those 
costs in the uniform budgeting categories adopted by rule by the 
State Auditor, and imposed as a local levy a uniform statewide 
tax rate sufficient to finance the aggregated budgets submitted 
by the 29 counties. If, in any county, the levy for tax admin-
istration purposes generated an amount in excess of the amount 
budgeted by the Board of County Commissioners for that county, 
the excess funds were to be transmitted to the State Treasurer 
for re-distribution to counties like Tooele County where the tax 
rate was insufficient to generate the aimount required for the 
tax administration system. County commissions were free to 
budget and expend whatever funds they deemed necessary to 
accomplish the operation of the property tax administration 
system. In the event the expenditures were not within one of 
the uniform categories adopted and approved by the State Audi-
tor, the County Commission retained the authority to provide for 
the expenditure from other county revenues. 
The utilization of an equalized statewide levy ap-
proved during the 1986 general legislative session was a de-
viation from the previous authority of each county to levy a 
separate tax for the cost of assessing, collecting and dis-
tributing property taxes. The equalized levy was in specific 
recognition of the significant differences in property tax 
valuation throughout the 29 counties. Many counties such as 
Tooele County, possess insufficient tax base to fully fund the 
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cost of property tax assessment, collection and distribution 
with the tax rate authorized by the Legislature for that pur-
pose. The utilization of an equalized tax rate was an attempt 
to minimize the negative impact of this disparity in taxing 
capability. As a solution it received the unanimous support of 
the cities, counties and school districts which are three major 
groups which had previously been involved in litigation over 
these same issues (see Affidavit attached hereto). 
It is against this background that the present Act, 
codified as Utah Code Ann. §17-19-15 (1953, as amended), must be 
analyzed. The present Act is the Legislature^ considered 
solution to the need for an equalized, efficient mechanism to 
pay for the costs of a statewide property tax assessment, 
collection and distribution system. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
CONTRARY TO PLAINTIFFS' ERRONEOUS ASSERTION, 
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL HAS NOT HELD S.B. 151 TO 
BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
Plaintiffs, in their Amended Complaint at paragraph 
25 make the following assertion: 
"...the Utah Attorney General has rendered an 
opinion holding S.B. 151, Utah Code Annotated 
§17-15-19, is unconstitutional..." 
Q 
At page 24 and 25 of Plaintiffs' Memorandum the 
following statement is made: "Indeed, the Attorney General's 
analysis of the Act does not claim that the language of the Act 
or the procedures outlined therein are so vague and ambiguous 
that the Court can construe them so as to save them from being 
declared unconstitutional," 
Much of Plaintiffs' Complaint and Memorandum are 
premised upon the assertion that the Attorney General has held 
the Act to be unconstitutional. That position is not only 
without merit, but is an exaggeration or a misrepresentation. 
The opinion does not "hold" S.B. 151 to be unconsti-
tutional. Indeed, Plaintiffs' attorney Max Miller was in Court 
on September 1, 1988, when the author of the opinion, Ralph L. 
Finlayson, Assistant Attorney General, made an appearance in 
the case before Judge Tibbs where the constitutionality of the 
same statute was being argued. The position of the Attorney 
General with regard to the statute and its opinion was set 
forth in a letter in said proceedings to the Honorable Don V. 
Tibbs, District Court Judge, wherein it is stated: 
"The counties are vigorously and adequately 
representing the interest in upholding the 
statute at issue. The Attorney General has 
provided an opinion on the central issue 
involved, which opinion speaks for itself. 
The opinion is already a part of the Court 
record and is hereby tendered to assist in 
addressing the issue. The opinion is an 
analysis that does not purport to bind the 
Court and is not an unequivocal declaration of 
constitutionality or unconstitutionality." 
(Emphasis supplied.) See Exhibit "A", letter 
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of Ralph L. Finlayson to The Honorable Don V. 
Tibbs, dated August 26, 1988. 
Even assuming arguendo that Plaintiffs1 mis-character-
ization is correct, Plaintiff cites no authority for the 
proposition that an opinion by the Attorney General can rule 
an act of the legislature to be unconstitutional and have that 
determination by binding upon the Courts. Indeed, under the 
doctrine of the separation of powers that determination has 
been given, exclusively to the judicial branch of government, 
not the executive branch* The Courts, not the Attorney General 
determine constitutionality of statutes. To the extent Plain-
tiffs' Complaint, Memorandum and argument are premised upon 
such an assertion they should be disregarded as being totally 
without merit. 
POINT II 
SENATE BILL NO. 151, (CODIFIED AT UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED §17-19-15, DULY ENACTED BY THE 1986 
LEGISLATURE, IS PRESUMED CONSTITUTIONAL AS A 
VALID LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENT DESIGNED TO 
PROMOTE EFFICIENT STATEWIDE PROPERTY TAX 
ASSESSMENT, COLLECTION AND DISTRIBUTION. 
The plaintiffs seek to have this Court find the Act 
violative of various provisions of the United States and Utah 
Constitutions. The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed 
judicial restraint in finding any duly enacted legislative 
particular force to tax statutes." Rio Algom Corp. v. San Juan 
County, 681 P.2d 184, 190-191 (Utah, 1984). It is also presumed 
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that all legislative enactments are the result of the considered 
opinions of the state's duly elected and representative law-
makers. To find any statute unconstitutional, the court must 
find that no reasonable reading of the statute permits a finding 
of constitutionality. [The Best Foods, Inc. v. Christensen, 285 
P. 1001, 1004 (Utah, 1930)]. If any fair reading of the statute 
permits a constitutional interpretation, the Court must uphold 
it. It is against this strong presumption that the statutory 
scheme discussed below must be analyzed,, 
POINT III 
THE ACT AND THE TAX LEVY IMPOSED THEREUNDER 
ARE IN FURTHERANCE OF A STATEWIDE PUBLIC 
PURPOSE AND THUS DO NOT VIOLATE UTAH CONSTITU-
TION ARTICLE XIII, §5. 
Plaintiffs claim the Act violates Utah Const. Art. 
XIII, §5 by allowing the Legislature to impose taxes for County 
purposes, by granting the State Auditor excessive control over 
local budgetary decisions and by forcing Counties to share 
property tax revenues with each other. In construing the 
statute it must be read so as to give effect to the Legislative 
purpose utilizing the plain meaning of the statutory language. 
The statute under attack is a funding mechanism designed, after 
many years and several attempts to achieve a reasonable, effi-
cient and equalized system of paying for the costs of assessing, 
collecting and distributing property taxes. The Act unequivo-
cally provides that "to promote appraisal and equalization...and 
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effective collection or property tax proceeds," proper offi-
cials , based upon reasonable economic data and assumptions, must 
levy a tax uniformly statewide. As has been previously set 
forth for this Court's consideration, the mechanism employed by 
this Act is not an aberration. Other statutes resolve similar 
statewide concerns through funding mechanisms that reallocate 
revenues between local entities. As an example, the statewide 
Uniform School Fund levy also appears as a local levy on proper-
ty tax notices. Utah Code Ann. §53-7-17, §53-7-18, and 
§59-2-904 (1953, as amended). 
Plaintiffs' challenges to the Act rely extensively on 
several Utah Supreme Court decisions issued between 1901 and 
1936. State v. Standford, 24 Utah 148, 66).1061 (1901); State 
v. Eldredge, 27 Utah 477, 76 P.337 (1904); Bailey v. VanDyke, 66 
Utah 184, 240 P.242 (1925); The Best Foods v. Christensen, 285 
P.1001 (Utah 1930); Smith v. Carbon County, 63 P.2d 259 (Utah 
1936) . These early cases are distinguishable from the case at 
bar both factually and legally. Additionally, several recent 
cases however have significantly diminished the relevance of the 
earlier authority in assessing the constitutionality of funding 
mechanisms authorized by the Legislature as in the public 
interest—especially where matters of statewide concern are 
involved. Tribe v. Salt Lake City Corp., 540 P.2d 499 (Utah 
1975); Salt Lake County v. Murray City Redevelopment, 598 P. 2d 
1339 (Utah 1979); U.T.F.C. V. Wilkinson, 723 P. 2d 406 (Utah 
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1986). See also A, Lynn Jr., Financing Modernized and unmod-
ernized Local Government in the Age of Aquarius, 1971 Utah 
L.REV.30, Under this latter line of cases, the funding mecha-
nism established by the Act is clearly constitutional. Finally, 
the clear distinctions between the statutory mechanism set out 
in the Act support validation even under the earlier strict 
construction of Utah Const. Art. XIII, §5. 
In State v. Standford, 24 Utah 148, 66 P.1061 (1901) 
the Legislature imposed upon counties the requirement of hiring 
and paying a pre-selected fruit tree inspector. This employee 
performed duties under the direction of the state board of 
horticulture and had the unrestricted authority to hire dep-
uties. In striking down the Act, the Court held that it imper-
missibly usurped county administrative ciuthority, created county 
debt without county consent, violated the constitutional prohi-
bition against imposing a local tax for the solely local pur-
pose, lacked uniformity of operation, and lacked a state pur-
pose. There was no statement of state purpose in the act under 
review. The Court recognized the state possessed clear author-
ity to impose taxes for state purposes. Ijd. at 1062. 
Substantial differences exist between the current Act 
and the scheme addressed by the Standford court. In the instant 
case, county employees, subject to the control of county offi-
cials, continue to perform their statutorily imposed respon-
sibilities. Budgets and expenditures remain under county 
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control. Tax rates are applied uniformly statewide, and the 
funding mechanism furthers a comprehensive statewide public 
purpose. Uniform and efficient property tax assessment and 
collection were the same goals sought by the earlier state 
funded reappraisal and assessment plat review programs and are 
the precise public policy objectives articulated by the legisla-
ture in the body of the current act. 
Three years later, the Court again considered the 
application of Article XIII Section 5 to a legislative act. In 
State v. Eldredge, 76 P.337 (Utah 1904), the Legislature au-
thorized the State Board of Equalization to assess or value 
certain property situated wholly within one county. This duty 
was constitutionally vested in county officials. That portion 
of the statute authorizing state assessment or valuation of 
property situated or operated wholly within one county was 
severed or voided. No fair reading permitted upholding that 
portion in light of the specific Constitutional limitation of 
Utah Cost. Art. XIII, §11. It should be noted that the consti-
tutional provision relied upon by the Court has been amended 
three times since the 1904 decision. The constitutional sepa-
ration of state and local functions has been abolished and the 
clear supervisory control of the State Tax Commission has been 
reinforced. In fact, much of the litany of potential abuse 
cited by the Eldredge Court (and by Plaintiffs) is now constitu-
tionally sanctioned by express constitutional language. 
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Eldredge thus provides little guidance to this Court in 
determining questions of state purpose and state taxation• In 
the case at hand, the Act can be read fairly without finding 
clear violations to Article XIII, Section 5 or Article XIII, 
Section 11 • The duties and functions of each public official 
set forth in the Act come within and are consistent with the 
respective statutorily permitted duties for each such public 
position. (See, Utah Code Ann. §59-1-210, general powers and 
duties of State Tax Commission; Utah Code Ann. §17-5-52, -53, 
-54, duties of Board of County Commissioners; Utah Code Ann. 
§67-3-1, general functions and duties of State Auditor; Utah 
Code Ann. §67-4-1, general duties of State Treasurer.) 
In 1925 the Court again considered an Article XIII 
Section 5 challenge to a law providing for agricultural exten-
sion services throughout the state. In Bailey v. Van Dyke, 2 40 
P.454 (Utah 1925), the Court upheld a law authorizing county 
commissions to enter contracts for state agricultural extension 
services with the local taxes. 
Certain distinctions between Bailey and the present 
case should be noted for proper understanding of the real 
issues. In Bailey, local governments could, at their option 
enter into contracts for agricultural extension services. A 
local decision supported by a local tax would result; no section 
of the Constitution was violated. The plaintiffs contend that 
Bailey would prohibit requiring that taxes be imposed to fund 
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the administration of the property tax system. Such a con-
tention ignores the statewide public purpose addressed by the 
Act. In the present case, a legislatively defined statewide 
concern required a statewide remedy and it is well settled that 
the Legislature in furtherance of a statewide purpose may 
require the imposition of local tax levies. Such is the case 
with the analogous Uniform School Fund levy described above. 
Plaintiffs also seek support in Smith v. Carbon 
County, 63 P. 2d 259 (Utah 1936.) The Act under review by the 
Smith Court involved the imposition by county clerks of probate 
fees graduated according to the size of the estate. At the 
outset it must be noted that Smith was not an Article XIII, §5 
case. The only reference to that provision is a passing one—in 
dicta. The case largely revolved around whether the probate 
charge was a "fee" or a "tax." The Court concluded that it was 
a "tax1 which, because of its graduated nature, violated the 
uniform and equal provisions. As the Article XIII §5 issues 
were not briefed the Court didn't address them. Thus the case 
is of little support to the Plaintiffs since there is clear 
authority for sustaining the power of the State to impose 
burdens on local government and require the imposition of taxes 
to pay for them. The Best Foods, Inc. v. Christensen, 2 85 
P.1001-1004 (Utah 1930.) 
Finally, plaintiffs rely on The Best Foods, Inc. v. 
Christensen, 285 P.1001 (Utah 1930) for the proposition that the 
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current Act intrudes impermissibly into the right of local 
self-government. In Best Foods, a legislative requirement that 
local officials grant and sell permits prior to allowing commer-
cial trade of oleomargarine was upheld even though the local 
governments were directed to charge and keep the administrative 
fees allowed. While the Court stated that the "very essence of 
local self-government/' was the power of municipalities to 
collect and control revenues. Id., at 1003, it upheld the act 
first stating clearly the rule that a statute must be found 
constitutional if susceptible to a valid interpretation. 
Second, the Court found that the Legislature acted well within 
its power in imposing a duty on local governments to assist the 
state in enforcing the Act and furthering a statewide purpose. 
Id. at 1004. The Court also noted that the Legislature may, 
under settled authority, impose on counties the duty to impose 
taxes other than for its own purposes. Ld. at 1004. This 
reasoning applies with equal force in the instant case where 
property tax administration has been the subject of extensive 
legislative control and state financial and administrative 
involvement. 
While these early decisions by the Utah Supreme Court 
strictly construed the constitutional restriction on the Legis-
lature vis-a-vis local governments1 sovereignty, the Court has 
taken a far more pragmatic approach in later years. These later 
cases stress the importance of granting deference to legislative 
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enactments responding to statewide concerns, even when the 
concerns may initially appear as localized issues. 
In Tribe v. Salt Lake City Corp., 540 P.2d 499 (Utah 
1975) the Court considered the Article XIII Section 5 challenge 
to the Utah Neighborhood Development Act, Plaintiffs had 
alleged that the state's diversion of locally assessed and 
collected property taxes to a local redevelopment agency's use 
was unconstitutional* Finding the act to have a statewide 
purpose, the facial appearance of local benefits accruing to an 
agency controlled by a Board of Directors composed of the Salt 
Lake City Council occurring at the instance of a legislative act 
was not controlling. To respond to a statewide concern, blight-
ed areas, "the law is well settled that in exercising the powers 
of the state the Legislature may require the revenue of a 
municipality, raised by taxation, to be applied to uses other 
than that for which the taxes were levied." Ld. at 504. 
The holding in Tribe is important to the present case 
because it properly recognizes the Legislature's authority to 
recognize a legitimate statewide purpose (i.e., respectively, 
rid localities on a statewide basis of blighted areas, Tribe; 
and create an efficient statewide assessment , collection and 
distribution mechanism of all property tax proceeds for the 
benefit of all, the instant case), and the concomitant authority 
to require imposition of a tax for or the diversion of local 
revenue to that identified specific statewide purpose. 
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Following Tribe, in Salt Lake County v. Murray City 
Redevelopment, 598 P.2d 1339 (Utah 2979), this Court again 
upheld the Utah Neighborhood Redevelopment Act and found the 
diversion of locally assessed taxes to the Murray City project's 
use as a proper exercise of the state's power to tax for the 
benefit of the public at large. The Salt Lake County Court took 
the opportunity to reaffirm its earlier conclusions in Tribe. 
The Legislature is empowered to redirect the tax revenues of 
local governments for purposes it has concluded are statewide 
concerns. Additionally, the Court pointed out that the Plain-
tiff Salt Lake County was not deprived of its taxes to the sole 
benefit of Murray City. The County's "power to assess and 
collect taxes for all purposes of such corporation" remained 
intact. Ici. at 1343. 
These two recent cases clearly demonstrate the Court's 
approval of taxing mechanisms created by the Legislature to 
resolve identified statewide concerns such as that faced in the 
present case. Even earlier cases relied on by the plaintiffs 
reference the principle of state purpose as justification for 
legislatively imposed taxes or diversions of locally assessed 
taxes. These later cases clearly note the overriding state 
purpose and uphold the legislative acts satisfying that defini-
tion. There is no intimation by the earlier courts that if in 
fact a statewide purpose were at issue that the acts would not 
have been upheld. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has recently and succinctly 
stated the roles of the judiciary and the Legislature relative 
to public purpose enactments. 
Due respect for the legislative prerogative in 
lav/ making requires that the judiciary not 
interfere with enactments of the Legislature 
where disagreement is founded only on policy 
considerations and the legislative scheme 
employs reasonable means to effectuate a 
legitimate objective. 
Utah Technology Finance Corp. v. Wilkinson, 723 P.2d 406, 412 
(Utah 1986), citing Baker v. Matheson, 607 P.2d 233 (Utah 1979). 
Continuing in this narrative, the UTFC Court, citing with favor 
its opinion in Rio Algom Corp. v. San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184 
(Utah 1984) states: 
[A]cts of the Legislature are presumed consti-
tutional, especially when dealing with econom-
ic matters based on factual assumptions. It 
is only when a legislative determination of 
public purpose is so clearly in error as to be 
capricious and arbitrary that the judiciary 
should upset it. Allen v. Tooele, supra. 
Utah Technology Finance Corp. v. Wilkinson, 
723 P.2d 406, 412-413 (Utah 1986). 
And finally, the Court described the nature of public purpose. 
What is public purpose varies and changes with 
the times. In 1890, it was held that the 
purchasing and operating of an electrical 
distribution system to supply electricity to 
homes was not a public purpose. Maudlin v. 
City Council of Greenville, 33 S.C. 1, 11 S.E. 
434 (1890) . In contrast, in the past twelve 
years we have found public purpose in indus-
trial development by a county, Allen v. Tooele 
County, supra; eradication of urban blight by 
a quasi-municipal corporation, Tribe v. Salt 
Lake City; and the providing of funds for low-
and moderate-income housing by a state agency. 
Utah Housing Finance v. Smart, supra. We 
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cannot say in the face of those precedents 
that the stimulation of Utah's economy and the 
creation of employment is not a legitimate 
public purpose. It is closely related to 
industrial development and not different in 
kind. Whatever our private views on the 
matter might be, we must concede that the 
Legislature's determination that a public 
benefit would result was within its latitude. 
IdL at 413. 
The Plaintiffs, at great length, reiterate that the 
uniform levy to defray the costs of collecting and assessing 
property taxes created pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §17-19-15 
(Supp. 1°88) constitutes a legislative imposition of a local tax 
for purely local purposes in violation of Utah Const. Art. XIII, 
§5. Ignoring the long history of State involvement and super-
vision over the property tax assessment and collection process, 
they base their argument almost exclusively upon the fact that 
assessment and collection functions are performed by County 
elected officials. The argument is simply that if County 
officials perform these services, they must be County purposes 
and accordingly Utah Constitution, Article XIII, §5 must be 
violated. Such an argument ignores the historical development 
of counties, the relationship of counties to the State and the 
dual obligations of County officials in performing both State 
and purely local functions. In Utah, counties are legal subdi-
visions of the State. Utah Const. Art. XI, §1. They are 
organized and created by general law. Utah Const. Art. XI, §4. 
They are not municipal corporations of purely local character as 
defined in Utah Const. Art. XI, §5. This distinction is 
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important in the instant case since the Utah Supreme Court in 
Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake City, 134 P. 560, 564 (Utah 1913) 
defined a "local purpose" for Article XIII §5 analysis as one 
"for the public good, and not for a private purpose; that such 
purpose is not one which pertains to the corporate powers or 
interests of Salt Lake City." The critical question is then 
whether purely local self-government is affected. There, as in 
the instant case, "the state, ...simply calls upon its agencies, 
the counties, and the cities to assist in discharging a public 
duty which in no way affects local self-government." Id. at 564 
Counties, as legal subdivisions of the State act as instrumenta-
lities of the State in effecting State purposes. The State uses 
the County as its agent in the discharge of the State's func-
tions and duties. Specific examples of this role are found 
throughout Title 17, Utah Code Annotated. Sheriffs must serve 
all process when the State is a party. §17-22-26, Utah Code 
Anno. (19 53 as amended.) County Attorneys must conduct on 
behalf of the State all prosecutions for public offenses within 
counties. They must attend to all legal business required by 
the Attorney General, without charge, when the interests of the 
State are involved. §17-17-1, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended.) 
County Assessors, in cooperation with and under the supervision 
of the State Tax Commission, must perform all the duties mandat-
ed by Tax Commission Rule, the Legislature or the Constitution. 
Utah Const., Art. XIII, §11, and §17-17-1, Utah Code Ann. (1953 
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as amended.) Based upon this mix of delegated State respon-
sibility and the County quasi-municipal police powers over 
purely local matters Plaintiffs err in suggesting an 
interpretation of Utah Const. Art. XIII, §5 that ignores these 
differences. The State of Utah has a long history of 
involvement in and supervision over property tax assessment and 
collection matters. (Defendants Memorandum pp. 1-9). The State 
has paid for many of the local assessment functions. As early 
as 1917 the State, with State general fund revenues, was 
obligated to pay a proportionate share of the costs of 
collecting and assessing property taxes,, Compiled Laws of Utah, 
1917, §1561, Revised Statutes of Utah 1933, §19-16-16, and 
§19-16-16 Utah Code Ann. 1943. Specifically, those statutes 
provided "the sum (of the assessing and collection costs) so 
apportioned to the state and the state school funds shall be 
borne and paid by the state, ..." Clearly, the state could not 
legally expend state funds unless the expenditures were for 
state purposes. 
It is settled law in this State, as it is all juris-
dictions throughout the Country, that the Legislature possesses 
the authority to require local governments to impose taxes or 
spend funds raised by taxes to effect state-wise purposes. 
Tribe v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 540 P.2d 499, 504 (Utah 
1975); Salt Lake County v. Murray City Redevelopment, 598 P.2d 
1339, 1343 (Utah 1979). Plaintiffs choose to ignore this 
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mandatory aspect of Tribe and Salt Lake County. Also ignored is 
the simple reality that counties annually budget, levy, and 
expend millions of dollars in the performance of duties mandated 
by the State Legislature as part of comprehensive Legislative 
schemes for effecting State policy. State offenses are pros-
ecuted, state Courts are supported, state statute violators are 
incarcerated, and state standards for assessing and collecting 
property taxes are complied with, all by County officials, all 
with local property tax dollars, and all pursuant to comprehen-
sive State mandated policies. As noted in a leading treatise on 
County law, ... Everywhere, even in states having the aforemen-
tioned constitutional clause, (referring to a constitutional 
provision identical to Article XIII, §5 of Utah Constitution), 
it is agreed that state legislatures can impose taxes upon 
counties for state purposes and can compel counties to spend for 
such purposes even though taxation will be required. (Emphasis 
supplied.) Antieau, Local Governmental Law, §41.07. 
Additionally, uniform and equitable property tax 
assessment, collection and distribution has been a matter of 
general public concern since statehood. Equal and uniform 
assessment is required by the Constitution. The state has borne 
the cost of statewide reappraisal programs. Equalized levies 
have paid for the development of local property assessment plat 
naps. The timing, sequencing, and performance of tax adminis-
tration duties by County officials are all subject to 
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constitutional, statutory, and administrative control by the 
state. To suggest that the current Act violates local self-
government or constitutes legislative imposition of a tax for 
local purposes ignores both history and reality. The Act is in 
furtherance of resolving a matter of statewide concern and as 
such is constitutional under all the cases which have interpret-
ed Utah Const. Art. XIII, §5. In conclusion, the Plaintiffs1 
claims cannot overcome the presumption of constitutionality and 
the clear presence of a comprehensive state purpose. 
POINT IV 
THE ACT'S REVENUE SHARING PROVISIONS DO NOT 
VIOLATE UTAH CONSTITUTION ART. XIII, §5. 
Plaintiffs contend that the revenue redistribution 
aspect of the funding mechanism established by the Act violates 
Utah Const. Art. XIII, §5, by mandating revenue sharing between 
the counties. Plaintiffs' argument is that the revenue sharing 
allowed under that constitutional provision is a voluntary act 
engaged in by counties which may not be imposed upon counties by 
the Legislature. As discussed above, the revenue redistribution 
formula set out in the Act is not an anomaly under Utah law. It 
is similar in its operation to that created by the Legislature 
for funding the mandated minimum school program [see Utah Code 
Ann. §53-7-1 et seq. (1953, as amended)], or distributing local 
sales and use tax revenue. As part of a comprehensive statewide 
approach to funding the property tax administration system the 
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revenue redistribution aspects of the Act are clearly consistent 
with those approved by the Court in Tribe v. Salt Lake City 
Corp, , 540 P. 2d 499 (Utah 1975) and Salt Lake County v. Murray 
Redevelopment, 598 P.2d 1339 (Utah 1979). In each of those 
cases taxes properly levied by taxing entities within Salt Lake 
County were partially diverted to a redevelopment agency for the 
purpose of alleviating the statewide problem of blighted areas. 
In the present case, counties which generate proceeds in excess 
of their budgeted amounts as a result of the uniform statewide 
tax administration levy have those excess funds diverted to 
other counties in furtherance of funding programs leading to 
statewide uniformity of assessment and valuation. Such a 
program does not necessarily constitute revenue sharing between 
the counties, but merely a statewide funding approach to a 
matter of statewide concern. According, Utah Cost. Art. XIII §5 
is irrelevant to the discussion. 
Even assuming arguendo that the funding mechanism 
prescribed by the Act constitutes revenue sharing between the 
counties, plaintiffs' challenge to the Act on that basis must 
fail for several reasons. First, if the Act only allows 
voluntary revenue sharing, the aggrieved parties are not the 
plaintiffs but those counties which object to the revenue 
sharing. Plaintiffs lack standing to assert the claims on 
behalf of the counties and accordingly their claim should be 
dismissed. Second, the clear factual evidence as set out in the 
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Affidavit of Mr. Gardner and the joint statement of the Utah 
Association of Counties, Utah League of Cities and Towns and 
Utah School Boards Association, clearly establish that the Act 
was supported by the counties at the time of its passage. 
Subsequently the Utah Association of Counties, by resolution of 
all its membership, or the executive committee authorized to 
speak for it, has, on two separate occasions specifically 
endorsed S.B. 151 including the funding mechanism established 
thereunder. Finally, the Utah Association of County 
Commissioners and County Councils representing the governing 
bodies of all 29 counties of the State has unanimously endorsed 
the Act with its revenue sharing provisions and opposed any 
attempt to amend or repeal it. To assert that the revenue 
sharing portions of the Act are contrary to the wishes of the 
counties ignores reality. Third, assuming further that the 
financing mechanism does constitute involuntary revenue sharing, 
Utah Const. Art. XIII §5, is silent on the question of whether 
the State may re-distribute revenue when a statewide purpose is 
involved. The amendment of Utah Const. Art. XIII §5 was to 
allow voluntary horizontal revenue sharing (Plaintiff's Memoran-
dum, p. 22) . In support Plaintiff cites the "Impartial Analy-
sis" prepared for the 1982 Voter Information Pamphlet. The 
Amendment and the Analysis speak for themselves. The Amendment 
allows local governments to voluntarily share their revenues. 
It is silent as to whether the legislature is prohibited from 
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diverting or reallocating revenues between local subdivisions. 
The real question surrounding the 1983 amendment is whether 
anywhere in that amendment exists a prohibition against the 
Legislature imposing a tax or requiring revenue sharing for a 
state purpose. Defendants submit there is not. The amendment 
is silent on that issue and Plaintiff should not be allowed to 
create from whole cloth a non-existent Constitutional prohibi-
tion. Barring such a constitutional prohibition against legis-
lative action, Utah Const. Art. VI §1 clearly vests in the 
Legislature of the State of Utah all authority to legislate on 
matters of statewide concern. Kimball v. City of Grantsville, 
et al., 57 P.l, 5 (Utah 1899); State ex rel. Nicholes v. Cherry, 
Judge, 60 P. 1103 (Utah 1900); Lehi City v. Meiling, 48 P.2d 
530, 534, 535 (Utah 1935) . 
In summary, plaintiffs1 Utah Const. Art. XIII, §5 
challenge to the Act as "involuntary revenue sharing" must fail. 
Plaintiffs lack standing to challenge a provision that may only 
be challenged by the affected governmental entities to wit, the 
counties and, second, the record adequately supports that the 
revenue sharing of the Act is fully supported and endorsed by 
all 29 counties. 
Simply stated, Utah Const. Art. XIII §5 does not 
prohibit the diversion of local revenues to effect a statewide 
purpose (Tribe and Salt Lake County, supra.). Unless prohibited 
by the Constitution, the power to legislate on matters of State 
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concern is vested in the Legislature. Utah Const. Art. VI §1. 
The 1983 amendment to Utah Const. Art. XIII §5, allowing volun-
tary revenue sharing between local governments is silent and 
does not specifically prohibit the State from creating funding 
mechanisms, even including horizontal revenue sharing, when a 
statewide purpose is involved. Accordingly, Utah Code Ann. 
§17-19-15, is a legitimate exercise of the reserved power of the 
Legislature found in Utah Const. Art. VI §1 and is not prohibit-
ed by Utah Const. Art. XIII §5. 
POINT V. 
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE PROVISIONS FOR 
"REVENUE SHARING" AND THE ROLES OF THE STATE 
AUDITOR, TREASURER AND TAX COMMISSION ARE 
CONSTITUTIONALLY IMPERMISSIBLE, THE IMPOSITION 
OF A TAX LEVY TO DEFRAY THE COSTS OF ADMINIS-
TERING THE PROPERTY TAX SYSTEM IN EACH COUNTY 
IS SEVERABLE AND MUST BE UPHELD. 
Plaintiffs' challenge the entire funding mechanism by 
which local counties defray the costs of assessing, collecting 
and distributing property taxes. Those costs total approximate-
ly $23 million dollars per year statewide in all of Utah's 
counties. That amount is currently available to counties 
through the uniform statewide levy challenged by the plaintiffs 
and additional levies authorized by the statute for local 
reappraisal purposes. Assuming for purposes of argument that 
the plaintiffs were to prevail on their challenge to the consti-
tutionality of the Act, the issue must be addressed as to 
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whether the imposition, on a county by county basis, of a 
separate tax to defray the costs of administering the property 
tax system is severable and can thus be sustained. The Utah 
Supreme Court has addressed the issue of severability in several 
cases where a portion of a legislative act could not survive 
constitutional review even given the presumption of validity. 
The Court held in Salt Lake City v. The International Asso-
ciation of Firefighters, 563 P.2d 786, 791 (Utah 1977) "[sever-
ability, where part of an act is unconstitutional, is primarily 
a matter of legislative intent." Assuming this Court were to 
find any portion of the Act under challenge invalid, the legis-
lative history leading to the Act and the Act itself clearly 
permit the remaining portions (the tax levy) to stand, thus 
accomplishing the legitimate purpose for which the Act was 
drafted. The separate tax levy for administration of the 
property tax system was enacted by the Legislature some two 
years prior to the effective date of the funding mechanism 
currently under attack. (See Laws of Utah 1985, Chapter 88, 
Section 1). Under the 1985 enactment each county possessed the 
authority to impose a separate tax levy at a maximum rate equal 
to that contemplated under the current funding mechanism. The 
sole change in the financing mechanism created by the current 
Act was the equalization of that rate throughout the State. 
Thus, it cannot be said that the enactment of S.B. 151 con-
stituted a dramatic change in State policy with respect to 
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separate funding of this important governmental process. 
Against that context the decision of the Utah Supreme Court in 
Berry by and through Berry v. Beach Aircraft, 717 P.2d 670, 
685-686 (Utah 1985) is helpful. The Court in that case reviewed 
the provisions of the Utah Product Liability Act and determined 
that no portions were severable if no legitimate purpose re-
mained once the invalid section was removed. The courts stated 
that "we cannot conclude that the Legislature would have enacted 
Sections 4 through 6 without Section 3." _Id. at 686. It is 
clear from the legislative history commencing with the 1985 
enactment that the Legislature wished to provide a separate 
taxing mechanism by which counties could derive revenue to 
defray the costs of administering the property tax system. 
Assuming arguendo that any particular office is not permitted to 
perform the duties required by the Act or the proceeds from the 
tax rate may not be equalized, the main purpose for the separate 
revenue source still remains. Additionally, to declare this Act 
unconstitutional in its entirety would cause irreparable econom-
ic harm to this State and its political subdivisions. The loss 
of some $23 million dollars of property tax revenues, in the 
face of the loss of federal revenue sharing and depressed 
economic circumstances, would do significant damage to the 
re-appraisal and auditing efforts of the counties and State Tax 
Commission undertaken in aid of assuring equality and uniformity 
in assessment. 
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In conclusion it is the position of the defendants 
that the authority of each county to impose an unequalized tax 
levy within the current statutory maximum of ,0005 is severable 
from all other provisions of the Act. The Legislature would 
most certainly, as it did in 1985, have enacted a tax levy 
provision in this format or another. 
VI. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Senate Bill 151 was a result of several years of 
county legislative efforts in pursuit of a solution to the 
problem of financing property tax administration in each of the 
29 counties of the State. Its specific provisions were sought 
by the counties, endorsed by the counties and Tax Commission and 
remain supported by the counties and Tax Commission. (See 
Affidavit of R.H. Hansen, Chairmant Utah State Tax Commission,) 
It allows county officials to continue to perform their 
statutorily designated responsibilities; Boards of County 
Commissioners retain control over budgets and expenditures, they 
have the authority to expend any funds they deem necessary, not 
only through the proceeds of the Uniform Tax Administration levy 
but through such other general fund revenue sources as they 
possess. No county officials1 responsibilities are impaired by 
the statute and, accordingly, the intrusion of the Act into 
local government affairs is minimal. The utilization of the 
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funding mechanism established by the Legislature (a uniform 
equalized statewide levy) is a valid exercise of legislative 
authority in pursuit of a remedy for a statewide problem. Since 
statehood, the Legislature and State Tax Commission have been 
integrally involved in the operation of the property tax 
assessment, collection and distribution systems in each county 
of the State. The State has utilized proceeds from the Uniform 
School Fund (an uniform equalized statewide levy) to compensate 
county officials for the preparation of real property tax maps. 
The State has utilized general fund revenues to pay its share of 
the costs of programs. Additionally, the Legislature has vested 
in the State Tax Commission the authority, in pursuit of 
statewide equalization and uniformity of valuation, direct 
adjustment of local values or even re-appraisal of local 
properties. To suggest that the tax levy established by the Act 
was not a funding mechanism in furtherance of the matter of 
statewide concern ignores both historical and current reality. 
Under Utah Const. Art. XIII, Section 5 as interpreted by the 
Utah Supreme Court in Tribe v. Salt Lake City Corp., 540 P. 2d 
49 9 (Utah 19 75) , and Salt Lake County v. Murray Redevelopment 
Agency, 598 P.2d 1339 (Utah 1979), the funding mechanism estab-
lished by the Act now under review is a permissible extension of 
legislative authority in a matter of statewide concern. It is 
not a legislative imposition of the local tax for a purely local 
purpose. 
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In conclusion, the funding mechanism and budgeting 
mechanism are analogous to other funding mechanisms found in 
Utah law. It is directly analogous to the Uniform School Fund 
levy. Additionally the ACt intrudes no further into local 
government responsibilities than any other act previously 
adopted by the Legislature delineating the structure and opera-
tion of the property tax system by local elected officials. 
As such the Act should be sustained and defendants' 
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment granted. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED th: ay of 
1988. 
Jb*^zZ2^L< 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
KARL HENDRICKSON 
Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney 
BILL THOMAS PETERS 
Special Deputy Salt Lake County 
Attorney 
RONALD ELTON 
Tooele County Attorney 
BILL THOMAS^EETERS 
Special^-DeputyyTooele County, 
Attorney 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby certify that on this 14th day of September, 
1988, I caused to be hand delivered a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Memorandum in Response to Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment and in Support of Defendants' Cross-Motion for 
Summary Judgment, together with the attached Affidavits of L. 
Brent Gardner and R. Hal Hansen to the following: 
Max Miller, Esq. 
Parsons, Behle & Latimer 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898 
And mailed to: 
Ralph Finlayson, Esq 
Assistant Attorney Gpiieral 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, tfrtah 84114 
BPH:L 
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The Honorable Don V. Tibbs 
Judge, Sixth Jjodicial District Court 
for Garfield County 
55 South/Main Street 
Panguijxfh, Utah 84759 
RE: Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co, v. 
Garfield County, et al., Case No. 3273 
Dear Judge Tibbs: 
With a motion for summary judgment pending, I provide 
this response regarding the position of the State defendants. 
The State defendants in this case are the Utah State 
Tax Commission, R. H. "Hal" Hansen, Chairman of the Utah State 
Tax Commission, Roger ()• Tew, Utah State Tax Commissioner, Joe B. 
Pacheco, Utah State Tax Commissioners, G. Blaine Davis, Utah 
State Tax Commissioner, Tom L. Allen, Utah State Auditor, and 
Edward T. Alter, Utah State Treasurer. 
These State defendants have ministerial or 
administrative roles under the statute at issue, Utah Code Ann. 
S 17-19-15 (Supp. 1988). These roles are in contrast to the role 
of the counties, which receive and use money raised by the tax 
levies at issue. The counties, therefore, rather than the State 
defendants are the real parties in interest. 
The counties are vigorously and adequately representing 
the interest in upholding the statute at issue. The Attorney 
General has provided an opinion on the central issue involved, 
which opinion speaks for itself. The opinion is already a part 
of the court record and is hereby tendered to assist in 
addressing the issue. The opinion is an analysis that does not 
purport to bind the court and is not an unequivocal declaration 
of constitutionality or unconstitutionality. 
'2.**1 STATi: C M M T n i 
The Honorable Don V. Tibbs 
August 26, 1988 
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Under these circumstances the State defendants do not 
intend to be active as legal advocates in this case. 
Very truly yours, 
RALPH L FINLAYSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
Governmental Affairs Division 
RLF/cwc 
cc: Patrick B. Nolan, Esq. 
l/Bill Thomas Peters, Esq. 
David K. Detton, Esq. 
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vs. 
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Utah State Tax Commissioner, 
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Utah State Auditor, EDWARD T. 
ALTER, Utah State Treasurer, 
ARTHUR L. MONSON, Salt Lake 
County Treasurer; and GRANT L. 
PENDLETON, Tooele County 
Treasurer, 
Defendants. 
* * * * * * * * 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
AUSTON JOHNSON, III 
Civil No. 88-3457 
Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
• ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Auston Johnson, III, being first duly sworn and upon 
his oath, states as follows: 
1. I am an employee of the Utah State Auditor's 
Office and have been so employed for approximately 12 years. 
2. For approximately the past three years, I have 
been the Director of Local Government Accounting and Audit in the 
Utah State Auditor's Office, and before that, for approximately 9 
years, I was an Audit Manager or an Auditor in the Utah State 
Auditor's Office. ,Based upon my experience in these assignments, 
I have personal knowledge of the duties and functions of the Utah 
State Auditor's Office. 
3. In my capacity as Director of Local Government 
Accounting and Audit in the Utah State Auditor's Office, I have, 
among other duties, the responsibility to establish budgetary 
procedures and reporting requirements for Utah's counties as 
they relate to the Utah State Auditor's Office. Likewise in that 
capacity, I supervise the county reporting requirements estab-
lished pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 17-19-15 (Supp. 1987). 
4. Part of my duties in the Utah State Auditor's 
Office include the regular reception of records, data, and other 
reports from Utah's counties and the Utah State Tax Commission 
filed pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 17-19-15. From the data, 
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reports and records submitted to the Utah State Auditor's Office 
by Utah's counties and the Utah State Tax Commission, and as part 
of my regular duties to compile reports, compilations, records 
and statements therefrom, I prepared a chart attached hereto and 
labeled Exhibit "Al", which chart illustrates the operation of 
Utah Code Ann. S 17-19-15 for 1987. 
5. Exhibit Al is entitled "Assessing and Collecting 
Control" and is divided into two categories - "Contributing 
Counties" or counties which remit part of the funds generated 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 17-19-15 to the State Treasurer and 
then to other counties, and "Receiving Counties" or all counties 
which receive taxes generated from the contributing counties 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 17-19-15. The columns of the 
exhibit are explained as follows: 
(a) The first column entitled "Generated Funds" 
shows the taxes raised by each county, which taxes are raised as 
a result of the tax rates set pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
S 17-19-15. 
(b) The second column entitled "Allowable Funds" 
shows the costs the Utah State Auditor has, by rule, determined 
to allow as collection and assessing costs for each county. A 
copy of the relevant rule is attached and labeled Exhibit "A2." 
(c) The third column entitled "Expected Remit-
tance" (for contributing counties) shows the amount those coun-
ties expect to remit to other counties via the Utah State 
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Treasurer pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 17-19-15(6). The third 
column entitled "Expected Receipt" (for receiving counties) shows 
the amount those counties expect to receive from contributing 
counties listed at the top of the page via the Utah State Trea-
surer pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 17-19-15(6). 
(d) Column 4 in the "Contributing Counties" 
portion of the exhibit is a mathematical calculation showing the 
ratio of the expected remittance in column 3 to the total remit-
tance in column 8. Columns 5 through 7 show the remittances by 
the contributing counties. In that portion of the chart under 
"Receiving Counties" the fourth column is a mathematical calcula-
tion showing the ratio of expected receipts in column 3 to the 
total receipts. The other columns in the "Receiving Counties" 
portion of the chart show the ratio of expected receipt to total 
remittances and the first and second remittances. Column 8 of 
that chart shows the total amount remitted. 
(e) The final column in each portion of the chart 
shows that for 1987 nine counties remitted $2,090,457.24 in taxes 
collected by those counties to the other 20 counties of the state 
of Utah pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 17-19-15. 
Further affiant sayeth naught. 
DATED this affi^day of September, 1988. 
-4-
fau. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 33snaL day of 
, 1988. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
V&*1fcb 
My Commission Expires: Residing at; c4/Jj/r ^C$4J, U\UCU 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF 
AUSTON JOHNSON, III to the following on this U*>r) day of 
September, 1988: 
Bill Thomas Peters, Esq. 
9 Exchange Place, #1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Ralph Finlayson, Esq. 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
239:092288A 
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cansiBjnx ocwnEs 
OCtNTY 
BCK ELDER 
CACHE 
EMERY 
MILLARD 
SALILAKE 
SAN JUAN 
SLHHT 
UINTAH 
UTAH 
TOTAL 
GH«RATED 
FUCS 
569.209 
585,446 
792,297 
1,294,375 
8,737,075 
335,519 
1,073,637 
737,956 
1,929,306 
ALLOWABLE 
FINDS 
411,593 
520,814 
655,914 
485,747 
7,729,231 
205,830 
478,355 
504,251 
1,900,000 
16,054,822 12,891,735 
EXPECTED % Of IDEAL 1ST 
REMITTANCE REMITTANCE REMTTIANCE 
157,616 
64,634 
136,383 
808,628 
1.007,844 
129,689 
595,282 
233,705 
29,306 
3.163.067 
4.98 60.171.54 
2.04 
4.31 55,722.37 
25.56 101,274.12 
31.86 
4.10 
18.82 571,690.25 
7.39 
0.93 
100.00 788,858.28 
2ND 
REMITTANCE 
70,757.22 
76,250.73 
14,963.81 
794,938.00 
126,727.47 
18,197.81 
171,008.00 
28,755.92 
L,301.598.% 
3RD 
REMITTANCE TOTAL 
130,928.76 
76,250.73 
70,686.18 
101,274.12 
794,938.00 
126,727.47 
589,888.06 
171,008.00 
28,755.92 
2,090,457.24 
RECEIVING OLXNTIES 
COUNTY 
BEAVER 
CARBON 
DAGGETT 
DAVIS 
DUCHESNE 
GARFIELD 
GRAND 
IRON 
JUAB 
KANE 
MCRGAN 
FTUTE 
RICH 
SANPETE 
SEVIER 
iUUtLC. 
WASATCH 
WASHINGTON 
VtWE 
WEBER 
TOTAL 
GENERATED 
F U C S 
84,754 
376,509 
59,984 
1,500,704 
500,153 
103,177 
107,553 
283,234 
115,836 
76,859 
65,459 
13,396 
64,320 
115,658 
217,566 
1V*,/U 
154,169 
448,860 
25,118 
1,652,804 
6,285,825 
ALLOWABLE 
FINDS 
124,693 
451,870 
93.382 
1,539,923 
566,808 
149,061 
141,305 
438,058 
264,277 
246,979 
102,353 
64,055 
138,441 
280,991 
438,561 
iJ6,46b 
370,579 
690,399 
96,995 
2,259,547 
8,994,742 
GRAM) TOTAL22 ,340 .647 2 1 , 8 8 6 , 4 7 7 
EXPECTED 
RECEIPT 
39 ,939 
75,361 
33,398 
39.219 
66,655 
45,884 
33.752 
154,824 
148,441 
170,120 
36,894 
50,659 
74,121 
165,333 
220,995 
216,753 
216,410 
241,539 
71.877 
606,743 
2,708,917 
5,872,004 
% OF TOTAL % OF TOTAL 
RECEIPTS 
1.47 
2.78 
1.23 
1.45 
2.46 
1.69 
1.25 
5.72 
5.48 
6.28 
1.36 
1.87 
2.74 
6.10 
8.16 
8.00 
7.99 
8.92 
2.65 
22.40 
100.00 
REMITTANCE 
1 . 2 6 
2.38 
1.06 
1.24 
2.11 
1.45 
1.07 
4.89 
4.69 
5.38 
1.17 
1.60 
2.34 
5.23 
6.99 
6.85 
6.84 
7.64 
2.27 
19.18 
85.64 
1ST 
REMITTANCE 
11,630.56 
21,945.72 
9,725.76 
11,420.89 
19,410.47 
13,361.79 
9,828.85 
45,085.98 
43,227.20 
49,540.30 
10,743.83 
14,752.31 
21,584.63 
48,146.29 
64,355.51 
63,120.20 
63,020.32 
70,338.08 
20,931.16 
176,688.40 
788,858.25 
2ND 
REMITTANCE 
19.190.16 
36,209.97 
16,047.30 
18,844.21 
32,026.85 
22,046.66 
16,217.39 
74,390.89 
71,323.95 
81,740.42 
17,727.08 
24,340.98 
35,614.16 
79,440.33 
106,185.19 
104,146.96 
103,982.16 
116,056.31 
34,535.95 
291,532.02 
1,301,598.96 
TOTAL 
REMITTED 
30,820.72 
58,155.69 
25.773.06 
30,265.10 
51,437.32 
35,408.45 
26,046.24 
119,476.88 
114,551.15 
Dl,280.72 
28,470.91 
39,093.29 
57,198.79 
127,586.62 
170,540.70 
167,267.17 
167.002.48 
186,394.39 
55,467.11 
468,220.43 
2,090,457.21 
EXHIBIT A l 
Distribution of Property Taxes 
R130-2-1 Authority 
As required by Section 17-19-15(2), this rule provides the categories of 
allowable costs. 
R130-2-2 Purpose and Scope 
This rule sets forth the allowable costs of assessing and collecting 
property taxes by counties as allowed by current legislative authority, and 
for the purpose of computing the state-wide tax rate necessary to cover 
these costs. This rule 1s for the purpose of cost determination and 1s not 
Intended to Identify the circumstances or dictate the manner of assessing 
and collecting by counties. Allowable costs will only be considered to the 
extent they affect the property tax system. 
30-2-3 Categories of Allowable Costs 
Allowable cost categories are enumerated as follows; detail and 
explanation are located 1n the Uniform Accounting Manual for Utah Counties. 
1. Accounting 
2. Advertising 
3. Advisory Councils 
4. Audit service 
5. Bonding 
6. Budgeting 
7. Building lease management 
8. Building space and related activity 
9. Central stores 
10. Communications 
11. Compensation for personal services 
12. Data Processing 
13. Depredation 
14. Disbursing service 
15. Employee fringe benefits 
16. Employee morale, health and welfare costs 
17. Exhibits 
18. Insurance and Indemnification 
19. Legal expenses 
20. Maintenance .and repair 
21. Management studies 
22. Materials and supplies 
23. Memberships, subscriptions and professional activities 
24. Motor pools 
25. Payroll preparation 
26. Personnel administration 
27. Printing and reproduction 
28. Procurement service 
29. Professional services 
30. Training and education 
31. Transportation 
32. Travel 
KEY: property tax, tax collections 
1987 17-19-15 
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EXHIBIT A2 
Appendix A 
Appendix A 
17-19-15. Separate budget for costs of assessing, collect-
ing, and distributing property taxes — Submis-
sion to state auditor for review — Allowable costs 
established by rule — Transmission to tax com-
mission — Limitations on tax rate — Exceptions 
— Adjustments. 
(1) To promote appraisal and equalization of property values and effective 
collection and distribution of property tax proceeds, the county governing 
body of each county shall annually separately budget for all costs incurred in 
the assessment, collection, and distribution of property taxes and related ap-
praisal programs and submit those budgets to the state auditor for review. 
(2) The state auditor shall establish, by rule, categories of allowable costs 
and shall certify submitted budgets for compliance with approved categories. 
(3) Upon review and certification by the state auditor, the aggregated state* 
wide costs shall be transmitted to the State Tax Commission for determina-
tion of a mandatory statewide tax rate sufficient to meet those expenditures. 
By June 8 of each year the tax commission shall certify the rate to each 
county auditor for inclusion upon the tax notice as a separately listed and 
identified local levy. 
i 4) The tax rate may not exceed a maximum of .0005 per dollar of taxable 
value of taxable property except for: (a) mandated or formally adopted reap-
praisal programs conforming to tax commission rules; or (b) actions required 
to meet legislative, judicial, or administrative orders. Taxes levied for this 
purpose may not be included in determining the maximum allowable levy for 
the county or any other taxing district. 
(5) In the initial year that the levy adopted under this section is effective, 
each taxing district within counties which had not previously levied separate 
assessing, collecting, and distributing levies, shall reduce its property tax levy 
by an amount equal to that paid by the taxing district in the previous year for 
the cost of assessing, collecting, and distributing taxes. 
(6) Revenues received by each county from the levy authorized by this 
section in excess of the amount set out in the certified budget shall be trans-
mitted to the state treasurer for equalization and distribution to the counties 
in accordance with the certified budgets. Any revenue excess resulting from 
an increase in collection rates upon final settlement shall be deposited by the 
state treasurer in a trust account to be adjusted against subsequent years. 
History: C. 1953, 17-19-15, enacted by L. 
193* ch. 159,1 1; 1987, ch. 4,1 16; 19*6, ch. 
3, I 97. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment, effective February 6. 1987, in subjection 
<lt substituted "county governing body'* for 
"board of county commissioners" and in subsec-
tion (3) in the second sentence substituted 
"June 8" for "June 1." 
The 1988 amendment, effective February 9, 
1988, substituted "per dollar of taxable value 
of taxable property" for "of assessed valuation" 
near the beginning in Subsection (4) and made 
two minor stylistic changes in Subsection (1). 
Retrospective Operation. — Laws 1987, 
ch. 4, § 307 provides that this section has ret-
rospective operation to January 1, 1987. 
Laws 1988, ch. 3. t 269 provides that the act 
"has retroepective operation to January 1, 
1988." 
Cited in Boards of Educ. v. Salt Lake 
County Comm'n, 75 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (1988). 
